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Editor’s Urban Development Journal: 
 
Professor Will Macht, Editor 
 
 
The Downtown Retail Conundrum: 
Cores, Cars & Credit 
 
The Great Recession has created great havoc in the urban hearts of our cities. Retailers and 
restaurateurs, upon whom we have relied to activate our streets, have closed or downsized as 
patrons have found extraneous spending expendable and credit unavailable. With vacancies 
accelerating and finance evaporating, developers have retrenched. The conventional wisdom is 
to nurse one’s wounds and hope recovery will return things to former patterns. 
 
But it is precisely in these troubled times that one can see more clearly fundamental flaws that 
were concealed by ephemeral prosperity. What is revealed is a puzzling conundrum. How can 
one revitalize downtown retailing when every indication is that we will be able to support less of 
it? The essence of the downtown retail 
conundrum is that we have too much 
ground floor area seeking too much 
retail space from too few retailers, who 
seek to sell too many non-essential 
goods to too few customers, who 
increasingly have too little money to 
buy them and too little space in which 
to store them. What we need is not a 
marketing, advertising and branding 
solution to the retail conundrum, but 
rather a consolidation strategy to move 
surviving retailers to a Broadway cor-
ridor articulated with pulse point nodes 
of retail and other active street front 
uses implemented through a comp-
rehensive urban design and develop-
ment solution. Fortuitously, in the 
precipitous decline of the Great Reces-
sion are the very seeds of rebirth that 
will make it possible. 
 
 
 
Cores 
 
Recent attention by the Mayor and PDC has focused on the downtown retail core, branding it 
and putting gateways into it. One of the problems is that we have many retail cores and 
downtown retailing is fragmented, dispersed with haphazard and incomplete tenant mixes, 
disorganized operating hours and less than competitive with centrally managed regional malls 
and lifestyle centers.  
1-PSU 
2-Pioneer Sq. 
3-Brewery Bl. 
4-P.O. Blocks 
5-NW 23rd 
6-Old Town 
7-Rose Qtr. 
8-Lloyd Ctr. 
9-Central Eastside 
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The feature article in this issue by David Leland and Katherine Krajnak explores a current 
effort to revitalize the downtown retail core, currently defined as SW 2nd to SW 12th Avenues, 
Washington to Salmon Streets. That is an area including 45 of our 40,000-square foot blocks 
plus five of the South Park Blocks, which are half-blocks. 
 
But that retail core is only about 10% of the 
total downtown core, defined as the area 
between the Willamette River and I-405, 
which contains about 460 city blocks. 
There are several other cores each of which 
has a retail heart.  
 
The Brewery Blocks are the retail heart of 
the 45 blocks of the South Pearl district, 
from West Burnside to NW Glisan, 
Broadway to I-405. A growing retail corridor 
on NW Lovejoy from I-405 to NW 9th serves 
the 45 blocks of the central Pearl district  
 
between NW Glisan and NW Lovejoy west of 
Broadway, as well as the 40 blocks of the North 
Pearl district triangle and 10 blocks of the 
waterfront between the Broadway and Fremont 
Bridges. When the 12 blocks of the old 
downtown Post Office are added to the central 
Pearl, they could act as a retail anchor for the 
Lovejoy retail corridor. 
 
The 40 blocks of Old Town/Chinatown lack 
a retail core now, but the plans for a new 
Uwajimaya may help give it one. It is 
instructive to note that each of these areas 
has a grocery store at its heart: Whole 
Foods in the Brewery Blocks, the new 
Safeway on NW Lovejoy and the proposed 
Uwajimaya between 
NW 4th and 5th, 
Couch and Davis. 
The Museum Place 
Safeway at SW 10th 
and Jefferson acts 
as the seed for a 
retail core for the 
40 blocks of southwest end of downtown, south 
of Salmon and west of the South Park Blocks. 
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The 48 blocks east of the South Park Blocks 
between SW Salmon and SW Market that are 
built around a line of four full-block parks 
between SW 3rd and 4th Avenues contain City 
Hall, Federal and County courthouses, the 
Justice Center and Federal building, as well as 
the Wells Fargo tower, but are almost devoid of 
retail space. One might call that the gov-
ernment quarter and the large institutions, 
both public and private that predominate, in 
buildings that are recessed from the street and 
have little retail store frontage, are unlikely to 
gain much if any retail momentum. 
 
In what might be called SoMa, the 48 blocks 
south of Market, east of the South Park Blocks, 
plus the four blocks of University Place, despite 
the large number of housing units in the South 
Auditorium renewal area and the 30,000 
students, faculty and staff at Portland State 
University, lack a grocer or even significant 
retail space to serve the university. New 
development along SW Broadway and in the 
Urban Center plants the seeds for a retail core, 
but it has not yet blossomed. 
 
 
Finally, the 16 blocks at RiverPlace do have a small retail 
core but its isolation, lack of parking and small size has 
relegated it to minor seasonal status. The eventual buildout 
of South Waterfront and the OHSU Schnitzer campus may 
somewhat diminish its isolation and increase its eventual 
appeal. Yet it almost certainly will remain functionally 
separate from downtown. 
 
 
Scale 
 
When one realizes the scale of the downtown relative to its 
potential retail space, it appears inevitable that only a small 
fraction of the ground floor space will be used for retail 
purposes. The 460 blocks downtown provide about 18.4 
million square feet of ground level space. The 45 blocks of 
the downtown retail core, plus five half-block Park Blocks, 
provide maximum total ground floor area of 1.9 million 
square feet, just 10% of the total. 
 
Urban retail and restaurant space is predominantly a street 
level phenomenon, generating the highest sales and rents. 
Upper level retail space is difficult at best, and second level restaurant space is mostly non-
existent for logistical and market reasons. Multiple level retail space is confined primarily to 
department stores and malls. While Macy’s has six retail levels and Pioneer Place four, 
Nordstrom and Saks have only two. Pioneer Square, Park Block 5, several parking structures 
and surface parking lots are dispersed throughout the retail core, so the actual built space, 
only a portion of which is actual retail space, is significantly less.  
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Even accounting for upper level 
retail space in the retail core, 
total retail space is only about 
1.3 million square feet, acc-
ording to estimates from Cush-
man Wakefield based on a 
CoStar search. That is about 
half the 2.4 million reported by 
Economics Research Associates, 
which apparently did not remove 
parking space included from the 
scan. Cushman Wakefield’s 
estimates are very close to the 
1.3 million square feet estimated 
by CBRE in a slightly larger area 
that extended south to SW Main. 
Surprisingly, the PDC does not 
track actual retail space in the 
downtown retail core by location, 
tenant and size, nor have its 
consultants. 
 
Each of the other downtown retail cores, if 
actually tracked, would likely be quite small. 
The largest, the Brewery Blocks, was 
developed with about 160,000 square feet of 
retail space. When one adds the 68,000 
square feet in the largest anchor to that area, 
Powells City of Books, along with peripheral 
stores, the total is unlikely to be much higher 
than 250,000 square feet. The Museum Place 
and Pearl Safeways, each about 47,000 
square feet, of which only about 40,000 is 
retail space, are the largest anchors in the 
North Pearl and West End districts. 
RiverPlace has only about 26,000 square feet 
of retail space. So the aggregate scale of retail space downtown is likely to be only slightly 
larger and roughly comparable to that in Lloyd Center which has 180 stores in about 1.4 
million square feet. However, downtown retail is far more dispersed, does not have uniform 
shopping hours, centralized management, diversified tenant selection or free parking. 
 
The larger point with respect to scale is that 
roughly 1.8 million square feet of total 
downtown retail space is only about 10% of 
the 18.5 million square feet in street level 
space theoretically available. Conversely, 
over 90% of ground level space downtown 
must be activated by something other than 
downtown retailing, and it is unrealistic to 
think that retail space can ever be the public 
activator that many planners and civic 
boosters have hoped. Furthermore, we have 
spent too little time thinking about other 
ways to activate and use ground level space.  
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The Broadway Strategy: Connection 
 
 
What becomes quite apparent when looking at an aerial image of downtown is that the retail 
cores are widely dispersed and disconnected. However, it is also apparent, with a concerted 
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development strategy, that Broadway could become the natural and logical linking connection. 
Broadway is the most accessible street in the center of downtown with three lanes of through 
traffic plus continuous parking lanes on both sides of the street. Stores are very visible and 
accessible through its entire length. And it is the only downtown street that connects to two 
major freeways at each end making access to shoppers more convenient than any other. 
 
The 100% intersection, what retail experts call the Main/Main intersection, is the intersection 
of SW Broadway and SW Morrison, where Nordstrom and Macy’s abut Pioneer Square. 
However, with light rail on SW Morrison, there is little parking on SW Morrison and a large 
retail gap in the form of Pioneer Courthouse and Pioneer Square itself. 
 
Broadway is also the natural link between the 
Pearl district and Old Town/Chinatown and it is 
the terminus of the growing Lovejoy retail 
corridor. Felicitously, the 12 blocks of the old 
downtown Post Office intersect the Lovejoy 
corridor and terminate the North Park Blocks. 
Their size, accessible location and efficient multi-
block underground parking potential for up to 
1,300 cars per level offer significant oppor-
tunities to locate larger diversified anchor re-
tailers not represented downtown. For example, 
if a Target were to be located down-town, it could 
be accommodated and integrated with mixed-use 
development with the least disruption, yet 
efficiently serve the thousands of housing units 
that have been built around it. 
 
The Post Office Blocks and Broadway are not only the nexus between the north and south 
Pearl district with Old Town/Chinatown, they are also a gateway to the Rose Quarter and to 
the 30 blocks of the Lloyd Center as well as to other retail revitalization on East Broadway. 
 
At the other, south end of Broadway, the Broadway housing project has begun the creation of a 
retail corridor node at Portland State University. PSU draws about 30,000 people to its 45-
block campus and it owns about 4,000 parking spaces. Retail development at the PSU Urban 
Center is one block away. 
 
The Broadway Strategy: Consolidation 
 
Therefore, the Post Office Blocks and PSU could become two anchors to the mile and a half 
length of Broadway downtown. From Burnside to PSU is just one mile, 20 blocks long, and 
from Burnside to the Post Office Blocks at Lovejoy is a half-mile, just 10 blocks long. In their 
article in this journal, David Leland and Katherine Krajnak refer to their case study of 
examples for Portland, and Chicago’s Magnificent Mile is among them. That was the result of a 
concerted effort by Chicago developer Arthur Rubloff. The Magnificent Mile was proposed in 
Daniel Burnham's 1909 Plan of Chicago, and constructed in the 1920s. But it was Rubloff and 
New York developer partner Bill Zeckendorf who bought or gained management control of 
much of the property along the avenue, still at Depression-level prices in the 1940s, and 
proceeded to develop and promote it as the most prestigious address in the city. 
 
In terms of scale, if the half block depth on each side of Broadway for the 30 blocks downtown 
were all retail space, there would be 1.2 million square feet of space, the size of a regional 
shopping center, all of which would be accessible from on-street shared parking of 600 spaces, 
about the size of a six-story full-block parking structure. The 20 blocks from Burnside to PSU 
could house up to 800,000 square feet at half-block depths.  
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Of course, it is unlikely that a mile of continuous retail space would be infilled anytime soon, 
but there could well be many pulse point retail nodes along the way. There are significant 
development opportunities along the 20 blocks from PSU to Burnside, the 10 blocks to the Post 
Office, and the 20 blocks on East Broadway to Lloyd Center at Broadway NE 17th. The largest 
development opportunity are the 12 blocks of the old downtown Post Office Blocks. As noted 
above, the sheer scale, pivotal nexus location at the terminus of the Park Blocks and the 
Lovejoy Pearl retail corridor, 13.4-acre multi-block underground parking potential for up to 
3,900 cars, adjacency to the 420-space Station Place SmartPark, and proximity to the 
streetcar, light rail and intercity rail at Union Station give the Post Office Blocks the potential 
to be a major anchor to the Broadway retail corridor. In a development workshop we did in the 
summer 2008 term, we determined that a retail center of 270,000 square feet on the Post 
Office Blocks was feasible in the context of an overall mixed-use development that included 
850,000 square feet of offices, 1600 housing units and a 200-unit hotel. 
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At the other end of Broadway, many of the Portland State buildings could be reconfigured to 
offer storefront orientation to Broadway. Besides aggregating retail activity oriented to the 
30,000 students, faculty and staff, such storefronts could be used to provide university 
services like admission, registration, cashier, loan services, housing rentals, information 
technology help services, parking permit sales, visitor information, ticket sales, public safety 
services and other similar services. One needs to be careful to view retail activity to include 
public activity providing services as well as private activity providing goods. 
 
 
 
In between the Post Office Blocks and PSU there are eight surface parking lots and many 
underutilized buildings. In addition, there are some very significant buildings that need to be 
integrated with a Broadway strategy. The 511 Building being given to the Portland Northwest 
College of Art (PNCA) can have arts-related retail and service functions on Broadway.  
 
The Broadway Strategy: History 
 
The Broadway strategy is really one that builds on history. 
It is clear that Broadway was conceived as the Main Street 
of Portland. It is the only street in the center of the long 
rectangle of the city that connects across its own bridge to 
the east side of Portland, where it changes its course from 
north/south to east west. It is the street on which the 
main Post Office and Union Station were built, where the 
Federal Customs House was located, where the Benson 
Hotel and other main hotels were built, where the 
elaborate U.S. Bank and other major banks were sited, 
where the iconic Jackson Tower stands in the precise 
center of Broadway between PSU and the Post Office 
Blocks, and where 
every major theater 
was built.  
 
In short, the Broad-
way strategy is one 
to revitalize the his-
toric M a in  S t r e e t  
o f  downtown Port-
land, a fitting anti-
dote to ersatz life-
style centers. 
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The Customs Building is a notable building 
that may house the International School, 
which could help attract more people even to 
its less impressive NW Broadway side shown 
on the previous page. The Burger King site 
occupies a strategic corner at Burnside that 
could be re-developed for a visible anchor. 
The south side of the Burnside-Broadway 
intersection has a parking building on axis 
with Broadway that is highly visible. The U.S. 
Bank Building Annex directly across from the 
Benson Hotel also could be redeveloped. The 
Oregonian building could concentrate its 
services at its Broadway side. The AAA 
building is an anomalous automobile oriented 
use that occupies a full block at SW Market 
and Broadway that could be redeveloped 
more intensively. While some of the PSU 
buildings present formidable walls to 
Broadway, there are several locations that are 
redevelopable. In addition, there are wide 
openings into the campus on pedestrian 
streets at Mill, Montgomery, Harrison, Hall 
and College Streets that could be filled with 
retail kiosks. 
 
It is clear that in a time of the Great 
Recession and its aftermath, developers are 
most unlikely to be attempting the kind of 
retail development, just outlined for the 
longer term. However, the bad fortune of the 
increase in downtown retail vacancies, the 
decline of rents and the availability of a good 
retail building stock on the central connecting 
main street of Portland, with easy access and 
available parking, creates a fortuitous oppor-
tunity to entice retailers with less optimal 
locations to locate along a revitalizing 
Broadway. A quick glance at the map at right 
shows how splintered retail (in red) actually is 
in downtown Portland. The success of 
concentrating both pedestrian and vehicular 
retail traffic on a main street is a well-
established principle of both retailing and 
urban planning. In fact, the very economic 
stress of this current period can be the stimulus to rational consolidation. It is often said the 
there is nothing like the prospect of a hanging to concentrate the mind. But one needs to think. 
 
What is lacking is a concerted, block-by-block review of each block to identify and measure 
each site and building for its potential contribution to a revitalized Broadway retail corridor. 
With a concerted Broadway strategy, it should be possible to attract retailers from other 
peripheral locations. But downtown retailing is fragmented and no one has been charged with 
formulating and implementing a viable retail strategy, especially a retail master leasing 
strategy. 
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PDC Retail Master Leasing 
 
At a time when retail activity downtown is depressed, now is the time that PDC could formulate 
and implement such a retail master leasing strategy. When doing research for this piece it 
became apparent that no one could even provide, with consistent particularity, just how much 
active retail space actually exists downtown and what is the tenant mix of active retailers. As 
noted above in comments about scale, different brokerage houses define different areas with 
different criteria. Databases like CoStar include extraneous uses and areas in square footage 
calculations. And PDC has no detailed block-by-block, tenant-by-tenant inventory. 
 
PDC has relied upon consultants but recent ones, 
like Economics Research Associates and Leland 
Consulting Group, have not been charged with 
conducting such an inventory. Think about the 
implications of that. There is not a single regional 
retail center, like Lloyd Center or smaller ones like 
Pioneer Place, whose manager could not tell you 
instantly how much gross leasable floor area it 
holds, how many stores, their respective sizes, the 
tenant mix as well as the location of each store, and 
the annual sales of each store. Moreover, the 
manager could tell you which stores are vacant, 
when leases expire, how many parking spaces 
support the center, when peak occupancy periods 
are and assure you, through common lease 
provisions, that every one of the stores is open the 
same hours. This is just base data that could be in a 
database managed by PDC for downtown. The 
implications are far reaching. How can PDC plan a 
strategy to revitalize downtown retailing if it does 
not even collect detailed basic data to know with 
precision what the problem is? 
 
Once PDC would know detailed basic data, it would 
also know which buildings are vacant, which are 
critical in location and size, and begin to be able to 
determine an appropriate tenant mix that fills gaps, 
and which tenants might be appropriate to do so. 
Any regional retail center has a complete, clear 
leasing plan the essence of which is apparent on a 
directory. Downtown Portland does not. 
 
The virtue of formulating and implementing a 
comprehensive tenant mix and location plan during a deep recession is that there are high 
retail vacancies that could be master leased by PDC at rents lower than at any time in recent 
history. Downtown property owners would be eager to lease at favorable market rents to a 
credit tenant like the City’s PDC. 
 
The next step would be for PDC to sublease to key targeted tenants at a below-market base 
rent. This process is analogous to what PDC has done throughout its history when it 
aggregates land parcels that it has purchased at fair market prices and then resells the 
aggregated land to a developer at a below market price. Land resale price write-downs are a 
staple way that redevelopment agencies do business. The problem is that PDC never directly 
recovers the subsidies of the land write-downs. 
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By contrast, retail master leasing builds in a method to recover the retail rent subsidies of the 
below market base rent. This is through the standard retail practice of percentage rents. If the 
PDC has done its job well and attracted the right tenant for the right space and for downtown, 
the key tenant should be able to exceed base rent sales levels and essentially repay rent 
subsidies to PDC through percentage rents. 
 
Moreover, there are other vital 
benefits to retail master leasing. As 
a condition of every sublease that 
PDC negotiates, there should be a 
provision that requires the store to 
be open for extended common 
operating hours. The busiest times 
for retail shopping are evenings and 
weekends, not surprisingly when 
most people are out of work. But 
many downtown stores are not open 
during those hours and there is no 
consistency among downtown 
stores. It is axiomatic that if stores 
are not open, they can make no 
sales. PDC could change that and 
once it has enough key stores in 
critical locations open common 
hours, there will be a tipping point 
when the rest must follow along. 
 
Another critical point is that PDC 
can fill non-retailing spaces with 
retailers and thereby ameliorate or 
eliminate gaps in the urban fabric 
that short circuit consistent ped-
estrian shopping patterns. If the 
hole is too big, shoppers will refuse 
to walk past it. Gaps do to the urban retailing fabric what missing teeth do to a smile. 
 
Cars 
Like it or not, traffic, cars and parking and have always been critical to the success of 
American retailing. It is no accident that the successes of the retail stores in and around the 
south Pearl district have been dependent upon the 1,300-space multi-block underground 
parking spaces under the Brewery Blocks.  
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As I pointed out in an analysis of multi-block underground parking1 if one allocates the non-
retail constituent uses at their common downtown parking ratios of one per thousand square 
feet or one per unit, the retail parking ratio of the Brewery Blocks retail space is four spaces 
per 1,000 SF of retail space, a common suburban parking ratio. And when one does the same 
thing for the Fox Blocks, the ratio is even higher at 4.5 spaces per 1,000 SF.  
 
Why is that? Except in the most dense and largest cities, the numbers of people who could live 
within walking distance is simply nowhere near enough alone to support substantial retail 
activity. Although research is scarce, estimates suggest that one luxury condominium unit can 
support only about 20 square feet of retail space2, so it would take approximately 1,000 units 
to support 20,000 square feet of retail space, just one half of a Portland city block. Support 
must come from other visitors to the area, and shoppers still primarily come by car. Moreover, 
when people shop they must carry the things they buy and most people are not content to 
carry them by hand or even on transit. There are also other paraphernalia, such as strollers, 
that many people use on shopping 
trips that do not travel well on 
transit. 
 
Retail traffic requires both visibility 
and accessibility. It is not surprising 
that retail traffic has not thrived on 
the Transit Mall. Restrictions on 
both turning and parking limit both 
visibility and accessibility to the 
stores. Light rail on SW Morrison 
and Yamhill create a similar effect. 
 
The situation on Broadway is very 
different. Stores are very visible to 
all passersby. Three lanes of traffic 
with synchronized traffic lights 
through the center of downtown 
attract visitors both in cars and on 
foot. Continuous parking lanes on 
both sides of the street make the 
stores accessible. Broadway’s length 
creates multiple corners, always the 
most desirable for retailers for their 
visibility in two directions. Some 
have suggested making SW Broad-
way a two-way street, as it is north 
of West Burnside. Clearly, this 
would increase shopper flexibility 
and better connect Broadway across 
Burnside, but left turn movements 
might hinder movement on the east 
side, which would have a single 
travel lane. 
 
                                                
1PSU Quarterly & Urban Development Journal, 4th Quarter November, 2007, p. 24; 
http://www.pdx.edu/realestate/research_quarterly.html 
2 Estimates are not definitive but, for example, Boston-based Goody, Clancy principal urban planner 
David Dixon states: “A block (30,000 square feet) of new retail would require approximately 1,500 units of 
new housing within walking distance.” 
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Source: City of Portland Department of Transportation & Macht & Company 
 
Although PDC has defined the retail core as the 45 city blocks (plus 5 South Park Blocks, that 
are half-blocks) between SW 2nd and 12th Avenues, and SW Washington to SW Salmon, it has 
not related that to the parking available in that core area. The chart above shows that there are 
over 9,600 parking spaces in that area but only one quarter of those spaces (2,467 spaces)3 are 
in SmartPark structures, owned by the City, that are most attractive to shoppers because of 
their uniform consistent pricing and lower rates. If one adds the 717 on-street spaces in that 
area, which are more attractive to shoppers because of their accessibility, and not functional 
for employees and office workers because of their time limits, then one can conclude that 3,184 
spaces are available to service the approximate 1.3 million square feet of retail space in the 
core. This quantity of parking equates to a retail parking ratio of 2.45 spaces per thousand 
square feet of retail space, 40% below the 4:1 ratio at the Brewery Blocks. 
 
It is instructive to note that the SW 10th and Yamhill structure, nearest to Nordstrom and only 
a block and a half from Broadway, versus three blocks for the other two SmartParks, has 
frequently been filled to capacity. Such popularity should raise serious doubts about PDC 
plans to demolish that structure. The SW 4th and Taylor SmartPark, connected to Pioneer 
Place, has the highest consistent percentage of average peak occupancy at over 85%. The 
highest occupancies have tended to occur on Thursdays, while the lowest are weekends and 
evenings, quite the reverse of regional retail center patterns suggesting that downtown retailing 
has not been fully competitive during the times that most retail activity takes place. This is not 
surprising since there are no common operating hours among downtown retailers and there is 
no entity that is attempting to achieve that end. 
                                                
3 SW 3rd & Alder = 839 spaces; SW 4th & Taylor = 833 spaces; and SW 10th & Yamhill = 795 spaces. 
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One can observe a decided decline in peak occupancies as the Great Recession has taken hold. 
 
 
 
Parking strategy should be endemic to downtown retailing strategies. To look at the big picture, 
a Broadway retail consolidation strategy offers the greatest potential. Retail and parking pulse 
points can occur along the mile and a half of Broadway on the west side and even extending 
the full three miles to just past Lloyd Center at NE 17th and Broadway. 
 
Along those 50 blocks alone, there should be approximately 1,000 on-street parking spaces [10 
per block face, average] available at no additional cost to the city. Progressive parking 
management can increase functional capacity significantly beyond that. If each space turned 
over every two hours, on average, there would be functional shared parking capacity for 6,000 
cars. 
 
At the heart of the Broadway retail corridor there are about 2,300 parking spaces at the Fox 
Blocks and the 10th & Yamhill SmartPark. To the north at the Post Office Blocks there could be 
at least 1300 spaces per level of up to three levels of multi-block underground parking as part 
of a mixed-use development that anchors the Lovejoy Pearl retail corridor, NW Broadway and 
Old Town/Chinatown. At the 
south end of Broadway, PSU 
owns about 4,000 spaces that 
serve the 30,000 people who 
gather at the PSU campus. 
About 2,600 spaces exist in 
City-owned parking structures 
on Broadway at the Rose 
Quarter that are now mostly 
vacant except for games. Those 
structures should also be 
SmartPark garages and act as a 
catalyst for a non-event oriented 
mixed-use development. And 
finally, there are over 5,500 
parking spaces at Lloyd Center.  
 
Those five pulse points along Broadway, i.e. PSU, Pioneer Square, Post Office Blocks, Rose 
Quarter and Lloyd Center, should be the consolidated retail heart of Portland. Public policy 
through PDC can and should undertake the steps necessary to stimulate and catalyze that 
consolidation. And I say consolidation simply because there will not be enough retail activity to 
sustain splintered retail throughout downtown as economic patterns change in the early 
decades of the 21st Century. 
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Credit 
The current credit crisis affects both retailers and consumers in myriad ways. There are many 
fewer credit tenants able to occupy retail spaces. This is not a new phenomenon but rather 
intensifies growing trends. Department stores, battered by competition from big box 
superstores, have been consolidating at record numbers, closing stores, downsizing retail 
space, reducing the number of SKUs [Stock Keeping Units] carried and inventory levels. Now 
many big box stores are suffering the same fate, such as Circuit City, Joe’s and Linen ‘N 
Things. While downtown Portland long ago lost downtown several department stores, since it 
has not housed big box stores it has not directly been affected by their closing.  
 
But smaller independent retailers and restaurateurs of 
the type downtown are not credit tenants for the most 
part, and they have had a much harder time surviving. 
Even larger restaurateurs like McCormick & Schmick’s 
closed its first and flagship restaurant on SW 1st and 
Oak. That does adversely impact downtown Portland as 
many have gone out of business and retail vacancies 
have risen to new highs. As online retailing––e-tailing––
absorbs scarce consumer dollars, pressure on inde-
pendent merchants will accelerate since e-tailers are the 
low-cost providers bearing lower rent, advertising, 
service and sales costs while reaching more consumers more frequently, on a 24/7 basis. At 
$204 billion in 2008, online sales represent support for 816 million square feet of equivalent 
retail space, or over 800 regional malls, that will not be filled.4 
 
There are many reasons to expect that the Great Recession’s effects 
upon downtown Portland retailing will generate a secular shift in 
retailing habits. A variety of factors give rise to this. Having overdosed 
on both public and private credit, defaults on both consumer loans 
as well as housing loans have risen to epidemic proportions. Banks 
have not only constrained new lending, they have decreased credit 
limits, increased fees and shortened grace and payment periods. The 
decline in housing values has sharply reduced or eliminated the 
equity consumers have in their homes, which has in turn dried up 
home equity loans that consumers had used as credit cards to 
bankroll current consumption.  
 
The rise in unemployment has taken many consumers out of the normal retail economy and 
made those who still have jobs wary about losing 
them. Portland is especially vulnerable because 
Oregon’s unemployment rate is the second highest 
in the nation at 12.4%, trailing only Michigan. 
Portland’s high attraction to the so-called creative 
class, college-educated 25 to 34-year-olds many of 
whom are unemployed, suggests that consumer 
expenditures by them and by their peers will be 
held in check both by lack of funds and fear of 
losing jobs. 
  
As a result of many of these factors, appreciation of economic apprehension has driven the 
personal savings rate, which had declined to nearly zero, rapidly to about 4.5% percent. Many 
                                                
4 Source: Forrester Research, Inc., Cambridge, MA, based on an average $250 per square foot in sales. 
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expect it to rise significantly more. It is ironic that the Chinese household savings rate, as a 
proportion of disposable income, is 30%, and has been rising rapidly in recent years. That 
figure is twice as high as the highest rate ever recorded in the United States. Yet it has been 
the poorer country that has financed the much richer one.56 
 
Besides the direct economic 
effect of the Great Recession, 
one should consider other 
issues. Baby Boomers and 
their children, the Echo Boom-
ers, control two-thirds of con-
sumer spending. The youngest 
of the Baby Boomers, (those 
born between 1945 and 1964), 
are now 45 and the oldest are 
64. Both have purchased their 
wardrobes, their furnishings 
and all varieties of other con-
sumer goods. Many are down-
sizing and finding the accum-
ulation of what many refer to 
as “stuff” more of a burden 
than a benefit. Boomers are 
also finding that their retire-
ment funds are severely diminished, compelling them to reduce expenditures. Lavish spending 
on the kinds of consumer goods and services many downtown Portland retailers have purveyed 
is no longer either affordable or fashionable. Both Baby Boomers and Echo Boomers have 
recognized such expenditures to be discretionary purchases that are among the things that can 
be reduced. As a result, both stores and restaurants have closed with increasing frequency. To 
a considerable extent, Echo Boomers have, both by necessity and choice, not adopted their 
parents’ earlier acquisitive consumer behavior. And many of their purchases are done online, 
not in downtown Portland stores. 
 
This is particularly true in Portland where urban living has accelerated and where conspicuous 
consumption has been the exception, not the rule. It is no surprise that high fashion has not 
prospered here. Combine that with Portland’s lead in ecological and environmental movements 
and one finds that the accumulation of disposable consumer items has not flourished here. 
One must evaluate with exuberant skepticism rosy statements and projections from California 
economists, Economics Research Associates, that Portland is under-stored and that “ERA 
projects that the net increase in demand for retail space in Central Portland in the 20 years from 
2010 to 2030 will be approximately 8.3 million square feet, or a better than 50 percent increase in 
retail space.” Moreover, this is not a pre-recession statement having been submitted to PDC in 
as recently as April 2009. 
 
Some have observed that there is tipping point in consumer behavior, a deflection point in 
psychology that is tantamount to regaining the same kind of frugality as that adopted by the 
generation that suffered the Great Depression. That was a generation that deferred gratification 
and only purchased goods when they had the cash to do so. Rather than credit, there was 
layaway where goods were set aside and could only be received once the last installment was 
paid. The first “charge card”, to be paid in full at month’s end, was not introduced until 1951 
when Diners Club issued the first card to 200 customers who could use it at 27 restaurants in 
                                                
5 http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/why-do-chinese-save-boys-want-to-marry/ 
6 http://www.bea.gov/briefrm/saving.htm 
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New York City. But it was not until the establishment of standards for the magnetic strip in 
1970 that the credit card became more common. By 1980, Citibank, which had lost more than 
$1 billion on its foray into the credit card business, got South Dakota to quickly pass 
legislation that repealed usury laws. Citibank moved its credit card operations to the state and, 
through a 1978 Supreme Court decision, was able to export usurious rates to other states. 
 
More broadly, why is it that the purchase 
of material goods is thought to be a 
public activator worthy of the expenditure 
of public subsidies? Why is it that the 
City of Portland awards FAR equal 
density bonuses for adding retail space?7 
Why is the City of Portland stimulating 
marginal consumption when our credit is 
overextended, our landfills are overfilled, 
our citizens are overweight and our public 
budgets are over-expended? Why is it that 
retail space is intended to be the primary 
required active ground floor use?8 
 
More broadly, what other urban uses can activate 
the ground floors of buildings? Why are the service 
counters of all government institutions usually in 
the bowels of buildings? When one needs to obtain 
a driver’s license, a passport, buy a stamp, mail a 
package, pay taxes, seek zoning information, 
obtain a building permit or pay a parking ticket, 
why is the service counter not visible and 
accessible from a storefront along a busy street? 
When a student needs to register for classes, pay 
tuition, obtain a student identification card, rent a 
housing unit or buy a parking permit, why cannot 
s/he do it at a storefront on the street? 
 
 
Public policies need to be reexamined. Why is it that residential space is not allowed to occupy 
ground floor space? Historic New York brownstones have done it for generations and 
contemporary Vancouver, B.C. housing has adapted it successfully. Why is it that residential 
parking space is precluded by city ordinance from sharing parking spaces with commercial 
uses? 
                                                
7 Central City Plan 33.510.210(C)(3): “Retail use bonus option. In the retail use bonus target area, 
shown on Map 510-4, projects providing retail uses receive bonus floor area. To qualify for this bonus 
option, floor area equal to at least 1/2 of the site area must be committed to retail space. For each square 
foot of retail space over this amount, one additional square foot of floor area is earned.” 
8 33.510.225 Ground Floor Active Uses 
A. Purpose. The ground floor active use standards are intended to reinforce the continuity of pedestrian-
active ground-level building uses. The standards are also to help maintain a healthy urban district 
through the interrelationship of ground floor building occupancy and street level accessible public uses 
and activities. Active uses include but are not limited to: lobbies, retail, residential, commercial, and 
office. 
C. Ground floor active use standard. Buildings must be designed and constructed to accommodate uses 
such as those listed in Subsection A., above. Areas designed to accommodate these uses may be 
developed at the time of construction, or may be designed for later conversion to active uses. This 
standard must be met along at least 50 percent of the ground floor of walls that front onto a sidewalk, 
plaza, or other public open space. 
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So we have seen that the essence of the downtown retail conundrum is that we have too much 
ground floor area seeking too much retail space from too few retailers, who in turn seek to sell 
too many non-essential goods to too few customers, who increasingly have too little money to 
buy them and too little space in which to store them. What we need is not a marketing, 
advertising and branding solution to the retail conundrum, but rather a consolidation strategy 
to move surviving retailers to a Broadway corridor articulated with pulse point nodes of retail 
and other active street front uses implemented through a comprehensive urban design and 
development solution. If the PDC can recognize and capitalize on the historic opportunity 
presented by high vacancies and low rents along Broadway through a retail master leasing 
strategy it can truly consolidate and revitalize integrated retail activity along Portland’s historic 
downtown Main Street. 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully yours, 
 
William P. Macht 
Professor Will Macht 
Editor, Center for Real Estate Quarterly 
Associate Director, Center for Real Estate 
machtw@pdx.edu 
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Downtown Portland Retail: A New Renaissance? 
  
David Leland, Managing Director, and Katherine Krajnak, Associate, 
Leland Consulting Group1 
 
 
 
As citizens of Portland, it is important to understand that the success of retail in our downtown 
is a measure of downtown’s overall success.  Similarly, downtown’s success is a barometer of 
health for the city and the region.  A May 2008 Oregonian editorial best sums it up: “Downtown 
is the place we play, go out to dinner and show off when company comes.  We want out-of-town 
guests to see the best of the region –– and the best includes the center2.”  The notion that 
downtown’s health is reflective of the city’s health has been a guiding principle for Portland for 
almost 40 years.  The Downtown Plan of 1972, along with then Mayor Neil Goldschmidt’s 
leadership, set a new precedent for downtown reinvestment and revitalization.  At that time, 
Mayor Goldschmidt understood the importance of making a high quality retail environment the 
center of downtown.   
 
Mayor Goldschmidt’s efforts resulted in the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area of 
1974, a recently retired district.  Significant downtown accomplishments followed as a result of 
public–private partnerships leveraged with tax increment financing (TIF) dollars: Pioneer Place, 
Tom McCall Waterfront Park, RiverPlace, the Yards at Union Station, along with many others.  
Major catalytic projects set the tone, with Pioneer Place being the most significant retail 
development. 
 
Now, more than 30 years after the pioneering revitalization efforts initiated during the 
Goldschmidt era, downtown Portland leaders and the Portland business community are 
pursuing a new approach for addressing the issues and opportunities related to downtown 
Portland retail.  At the heart of this emerging strategy are two core objectives not previously 
addressed in the history of downtown Portland retailing.  First, the emerging strategy will 
include implementation tools that are designed to make property owners and downtown real 
estate professionals more integrally involved in realizing such a strategy.  Second, downtown 
stakeholders and leaders realize that a greater strategy for how the retail sub-districts relate to 
each other and to other districts is lacking.  Therefore, a physical solution is being proposed for 
how the downtown retail is branded, how the distinctive character of the retail streets and sub-
                                                
1 Accompanying reports and publications on downtown Portland retail can be found at http://www.pdc.us/retailvision. 
2 Source: “Selling us on the Center”. Editorial.  The Oregonian.  28 May 2008.   
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districts relate, and how that translates to a clearly defined signature district at the heart of the 
city.  This article describes how Portland leaders are working to define a new strategy for its 
downtown retail core with fresh eyes.  With much discussion among downtown’s major players, 
a new strategy for a signature retail district in downtown Portland is emerging.  
 
The Downtown Retail Core Defined 
Before Pioneer Place, Nordstrom, or even Pioneer Square were developed, the 1972 Downtown 
Plan set the stage for investment in downtown’s retail core.  The 1972 Downtown Plan defined 
the retail core as “All blocks fronting on Morrison, Alder, and Washington Streets from SW 3rd 
to SW 10th Avenues.”  Since that time, the retail core boundaries have been extended west to 
SW 12th Avenue, south to SW Salmon Street and east to SW 2nd Avenue.  Figures 1 and 2 below 
show the retail core boundaries today, as defined by the Portland Business Alliance (PBA) and 
the Portland Development Commission (PDC).  It is interesting to note that recent investments 
such as Park Block 5, the Galleria, the Fox Tower, and the Meier & Frank building have 
indicated a shift in the retail core energy towards the West End, defined as the area between 
SW 10th Avenue and I-405, south of W Burnside Street.   
 
Downtown Retail Core Boundaries 
 
 Figure 1 – Source: Leland Consulting Group 
Leland and Krajnak • Downtown Portland Retail: A New Renaissance?  
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate • Quarterly & Urban Development Journal • 3rd Quarter 2009 • Page 23 
Downtown Retail Core Key Retailers and Landmarks 
 
 
 
 
 
At the heart of the central city, the downtown retail core contains approximately 1.3 million 
square feet of retail space3, compared to 1.4 million square feet at Lloyd Center. The downtown 
area, bounded by W. Burnside, the Willamette River, and I-405, has approximately 1.7 million 
square feet of retail space. Retail vacancies throughout the downtown are on the rise.  
According to the Norris, Beggs, and Simpson Central City Vacancy Survey, vacancies for the 
Central Business District (downtown) increased from 5.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 
to 9.8 percent in the second quarter of 2009.   
 
That said, the retail core is still in many ways the most attractive urban retail real estate in the 
Portland metropolitan area, despite the vacancies.  No other retail district in the region 
contains a confluence of high-end, luxury retailers such as Saks Fifth Avenue, Louis Vuitton, 
Tiffany & Co., Mario’s, Brooks Brothers, St. John, Mercantile, and others.  While average triple 
net rents range from $20 to $35 per square foot in the retail core, spaces on Broadway (before 
the onset of the recession) commanded rents as high as $60 per square foot.  These are the 
highest street-level (non-shopping center) retail rents in the region. 
 
The diversity in the retail core’s customer base—residents, employees, and visitors—may give it 
the capacity to attract and support more retail than it has space to accommodate.  Even in the 
context of these difficult economic times, the retail core may be able to sustain new retail 
growth over the next five years.  The past five years have shown almost no growth—only 14,000 
square feet of new space has been added since 20033.  Some downtown brokers and retail 
recruiters report that desirable retailers want to locate in the retail core, but they cannot find 
the right space they need to accommodate their business needs.  Factors such as small block 
sizes, fragmented ownership, and costly upgrades make it challenging for new retailers with 
                                                
3 Estimate derived from a number of sources: Norris, Beggs, and Simpson, Cushman & Wakefield, and Costar. 
Figure 2 – Source: Leland Consulting Group and Portland Business Alliance 
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larger floorplate requirements to locate in downtown Portland.  Said differently, attractive 
national retailers that want to locate in downtown Portland are often unable to find the right 
space that can fit their preferred format.  What is more, landlords are finding themselves in a 
tenant market that demands lower negotiated rents and more landlord concessions, such as 
tenant improvement allowances and other tenant benefits.  Combined public and private sector 
participation is a key component to overcoming this challenge. 
Building a New Approach from Past Strategies 
Over the years, various plans and strategies have identified key factors that impact downtown 
Portland’s retail success.  The key concepts, findings and recommendations of past strategies 
lay the foundation for the emerging retail strategy.  
 
In 2002, the PDC and the Association for Portland Progress (now part of the PBA) analyzed the 
opportunities and challenges for downtown retail and recommended a strategy for moving 
forward.  For the first time, Portland had a strategy that addressed multiple issues related to 
downtown retailing, market, policy and the physical realm.  According to the 2002 Downtown 
Portland Retail Strategy, downtown Portland (bounded by the Willamette River, W. Burnside 
Street and I-405) would have the potential to support $200 million in additional sales growth or 
600,000 square feet of new retail space between 2005 and 2015.  As noted above, only 14,000 
square feet of that growth has occurred since 2002.  
 
In 2007, the PBA and the PDC drafted an update to the action plan first presented in the 2002 
strategy.  Leland Consulting Group was retained by the PDC to revisit the 2002 strategy, 
update data and findings and evaluate the 2007 Downtown Portland Retail Strategy Update.   
 
Two key messages surfaced from Leland Consulting Group’s 2007 engagement.  First, the state 
of downtown retail was healthy, yet vulnerable.  At the time of this study4, the downtown retail 
core was doing well compared to other central city districts.  A number of national chain stores 
such as Express, Gap, and Talbots were achieving their highest sales in their downtown stores, 
ground floor lease rates exceeded those of any other shopping districts in the central city and 
the downtown retail core yielded the highest annual sales of any other central city shopping 
district (Nob Hill, Pearl district, Old Town/Chinatown, and the Lloyd district).  For as many 
indicators as point to its success, there are equally as many that show it could experience a 
downward slide, particularly in the current recession.  Some concerns included significant 
presence of transients and aggressive panhandlers, lack of continuity in key retail areas and 
stiff competition from suburban lifestyle centers and shopping malls.  In 2007, suburban 
shopping centers were outperforming central city shopping centers.  Pioneer Place and Lloyd 
Center were averaging $540 and $415 in sales per square foot, respectively, and Washington 
Square and Bridgeport Village were averaging $763 and $850 in sales per square foot, 
respectively. 
 
A second key message was that the public and private sectors together lacked a cohesive vision 
and collective strategy for downtown retail.  Unlike a shopping center, fractured ownership and 
management structures in downtown make it extremely difficult to maintain a uniform and 
highly effective shopping environment.  Therefore, equal participation from public and private 
champions is an essential component of the emerging strategy. 
The Foundation for a New Signature Retail District Strategy 
In late 2008, recognizing both the potential of the retail core to serve as a branding tool for 
Portland and the need to bring together public and private sector downtown leadership, Mayor 
Adams initiated a process to take a new look at the downtown retail core.  He was particularly 
                                                
4 Leland Consulting Group acknowledges that much of the real estate market data reported in the 2007 report is now 
outdated and, most likely, drastically different from 2007 numbers. 
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interested in how retail districts and streets such as the Magnificent Mile in Chicago happened, 
what Portland’s version of a signature retail district would look like and what we would need to 
do to get there.  Mayor Adams’ initiative was timely as the future of urban renewal funding for 
downtown had either vanished or been called into question.  The South Park Blocks and 
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Areas had expired and the expansion of the River 
District Urban Renewal Area has been appealed.  
 
Mayor Adams initiated two important actions.  First, he formed a task force of downtown 
stakeholders, comprised mainly of property owners, brokers and other real estate professionals 
involved in downtown to help guide a new vision for the downtown retail core.  Second, he 
retained Leland Consulting Group, urban strategists, to build on their previous work, to 
conduct case studies of five exceptional retail districts and to develop a set of recommendations 
for how principles derived from these successful retail districts can be applied to Portland.  
Case Studies: What Makes an Exceptional Retail District? 
What makes places like Newbury Street in Boston and the Magnificent Mile in Chicago special 
and successful?  This question led to an in-depth study of how exceptional retail districts are 
physically defined, how those retail districts developed over time and what common principles 
guided the success of each district.  With input from PDC and PBA staff, the following five retail 
districts were selected for the case studies: 
 
 Old Pasadena; Pasadena, California 
 Seattle retail core; Seattle, Washington 
 Robson Street; Vancouver, British Columbia 
 Magnificent Mile; Chicago, Illinois 
 Newbury Street; Boston, Massachusetts 
 
After conducting web, interview, and field research, Leland Consulting Group distilled a set of 
common success factors for each district and classified them into physical, organizational, 
market and political success factors.  While each district was physically distinct in its own way, 
there are attributes common to most of the case study districts.  The team evaluated each 
district based on how strongly it exhibited each success factor.  These ratings were averaged 
and compared against Portland, with involvement from City of Portland, PBA, and PDC staff.  
 
As a result of this research a number of key observations were made: 
 
 Through traffic and on-street parking.  All of the primary retail streets examined in the 
case studies have two or more lanes of traffic, either in a two-way configuration or a one-
way configuration.  Moreover, brokers and other stakeholders in other cities, including 
cities with a high transit mode share, such as Vancouver, B.C., emphasized the 
importance of on-street parking to create the reality, or at least the visual impression, 
that parking is available close to stores.  
 
 Compactness.  Most case study districts were focused on a relatively small area or had 
pockets of compactness.  The best example of this is Robson Street in Vancouver, B.C., 
which extends three city blocks and achieves ground floor retail rents as high as $200 per 
square foot (Canadian dollars). Compactness helps promote better continuity and 
concentration of retail energy. 
 
 Residential base.  As shown in the figure below5, all case study cities, with the exception 
of Pasadena (which has a significant visitor population), have extremely high residential 
                                                
5 Vancouver B.C. is not included due to lack of comparable data.  However, Vancouver is known for having achieved 
high downtown residential densities and most likely exceeds population counts exhibited here in Portland. 
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densities close to the retail districts.  The Portland population within a half-mile and a 
mile of the retail core is lower than that in the case study cities.  If Portland is to grow 
into a metropolitan region on the order of Chicago, Boston, Seattle, or Vancouver, B.C. 
and adhere to Metro 2040 growth principles, it will need to significantly increase its 
downtown residential population. 
 
 
 
Close-in Residential Population to Case Study Retail Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shown below on the next page are the descriptions and results of the physical success factors 
evaluation.6 
                                                
6 Information on the other success factors and detailed methodology are not included here.  For more information on 
the other success factors, the Findings and Recommendations Report is available at http://www.pdc.us/retailvision.  
Figure 3 – Source: Leland Consulting Group and ESRI Business Analyst 
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Physical Success Factor Evaluation for Case Study Cities and Portland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physical Success Factors 
 
 
High Traffic Capacity: Streets accommodate a 
significant traffic volume, either in a one-way or two-
way configuration with at least two traffic lanes. Two-
way traffic is preferred. 
 
Strong Anchors: Important retail anchors exist and 
are strategically located throughout the district to 
maximize their impact. 
 
On-street Parking: On-street parking is available on 
the main thoroughfare throughout the district. 
 
Public Gathering Space: A public plaza for large 
events and gatherings is located within or directly 
adjacent to the district. 
 
Access & Visibility: The retail district is conveniently 
located within the region, is highly visible and is easily 
accessed from nearby freeways and neighborhoods. 
 
Multimodal Access: The district is easily accessible by 
auto yet is also well-served by transit. 
 
Quality Pedestrian Environment: Streetscapes are 
inviting to pedestrians with wide sidewalks, ample 
way-finding signage, street furniture and other 
amenities. 
 
Proximity to Cultural Institutions: The signature 
retail district is close to supporting destinations such 
as museums, galleries, theaters, etc. 
 
Regulatory Standards: Special zoning and/or design 
standards apply to the signature retail and specifically 
reinforce the retail character of the area. 
 
Clear Relationship to Other Downtown Districts: 
There are clear linkages to adjacent supporting 
districts such as office districts, cultural districts, civic 
centers residential neighborhoods and university 
districts, 
 
Continuity: There are few or no retail gaps in the 
district. 
 
Compactness of District: The district is compact and 
walkable. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Source: Leland Consulting Group  
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Components of Portland’s Retail Strategy 
The emerging strategy and action plan will build on previous strategies, modified with new 
information and a new approach.  As a result of the aforementioned case study research, 
Leland Consulting Group was asked to develop a set of so-called big ideas that would help 
define a signature retail concept in the retail core.  The following subject areas are currently 
being discussed by task force members to determine what will be included in the new strategy 
and how these strategy elements may be refined or altered.  [It is important to note that the 
concepts presented here will be somewhat different from the final recommendations that will be 
forwarded to the PDC by the task force.] 
District Definition: Signature Retail Concept 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the retail core is currently defined as all blocks between SW 
Washington and SW Salmon Streets and SW 2nd and SW 12th Avenues.  One topic of debate is 
whether the retail core is too large.  The larger the district, the more likely there will be gaps in 
continuity and an encroachment into other downtown districts.   
 
Mayor Adams has asked the consultant team and the Downtown Vision Task Force to consider 
a signature retail concept for the downtown retail core.  This concept could take the form of a 
retail district, or set of streets, that function as the identifying mark for Portland’s downtown 
and for the city as a whole.  This signature street or district could act collectively as the retail 
anchor for downtown and as a starting point for Portland downtown visitors.  
 
The case study research verified that such a street or district portrays many factors that work 
together to make it successful.  A signature retail street does not stand-alone—it has 
supporting streets and a collaborative public and private effort guiding management and 
implementation 
The Backbone 
For a signature district to be successful, there needs to be a backbone of the retail core. Leland 
Consulting Group recommended that this backbone be defined as SW Morrison Street and SW 
Broadway Avenue.  Those primary streets are where the majority of investment in retail stores 
has been concentrated and where, collectively, the greatest number of success factors is 
already present.  As part of this concept, Leland Consulting Group recommended that the city 
consider returning SW Broadway Avenue to a two-way traffic flow to further strengthen its 
identity as a retail boulevard. 
 
The Backbone and Supporting Streets of the Signature Retail Concept 
Figure 5 – Source: Leland Consulting Group  
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Supporting Streets 
The supporting streets are where retail investment exists but, due to a lack of important 
factors, such as anchors, continuity or traffic, these streets play a different role in the retail 
signature concept.  For example, SW Park Avenue functions as a restaurant row, SW Alder 
Street could serve as an excellent location for more price-sensitive fashion retailers, and the 
eastern section of SW Yamhill Street (between SW 3rd and 5th Avenues) is clearly a location for 
high-end, luxury retailers, such as Saks Fifth Avenue, Tiffany & Co., and Gucci.  The following 
streets and street sections are defined as the district’s supporting streets: 
 
 SW Yamhill Street – SW 3rd to SW 10th Avenues 
 SW Alder Street – SW 4th to SW 10th Avenues (possibly SW Park Avenue) 
 SW 10th Avenue – SW Yamhill to W Burnside Streets 
 SW Morrison Street – SW 3rd Avenue to SW Naito Parkway 
 SW Broadway – SW Washington to W Burnside Streets 
 SW Broadway – SW Taylor to SW Jefferson Streets 
Quality of the Physical Realm 
The quality of the retail experience is in large part a function of the quality of the pedestrian 
environment.  This includes storefronts, street improvements, ease of mobility, the perception 
of safety and streetscape elements such as trash receptacles, benches, newspaper boxes and 
planters.  The success of lifestyle centers suggests that shoppers want to be in an urban 
environment, but they want all of the conveniences and features of a mall or lifestyle center to 
go along with it: safety, management, cleanliness, evening and weekend operating hours, a 
continuous, diverse retail mix and more.  While downtown Portland will never replicate a 
lifestyle center, it can learn from the basic operating principles of lifestyle centers and shopping 
malls. 
Safety 
Downtown retailers, brokers, and other stakeholders report that some of their top concerns are 
public nuisance issues.  Loitering, aggressive panhandling and other acts of public disorder 
create the perception that downtown is unsafe.  The sit/lie ordinance, which precludes 
loitering, remains a complex and controversial issue for both homeless and retail advocates.  
While the Street Access for Everyone (SAFE) initiative generated a comprehensive plan with 
broad-based support in 2007, following through with implementation and maintaining the 
momentum of the agreement between disparate groups has been challenging.  In general, 
downtown and city stakeholders understand that approaching the public safety issue in a 
comprehensive manner (providing services for the homeless while also keeping the retail streets 
unobstructed) is the preferred strategy for addressing the issue.   
Continuity 
A second key public realm consideration is the need for continuity.  The average shopper will 
walk approximately 1,200 feet (about a quarter mile) in a retail environment providing that 
there is a continuity of storefronts.  Vacant storefronts, open spaces, parking garages, and 
buildings with no active ground floor retail all create gaps in continuity and thus dilute the 
success of the district.  The proposed signature retail streets (SW Broadway Avenue and SW 
Morrison Street) have significant gaps in continuity: 
 
 Weak retail on SW Morrison Street between SW Broadway Avenue and SW 6th Avenue 
across from Pioneer Square; 
 No retail on the south side of SW Yamhill Street between SW Broadway Avenue and SW 
6th Avenue; 
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 Spotty retail on both sides of SW Broadway Avenue between SW Morrison and SW 
Washington Streets; 
 Weak retail on SW Alder Street between SW Broadway Avenue and SW 5th Avenue (with 
the exception of Macy’s); 
 Banks and service businesses occupying critical corners; and 
 Other weak or spotty retail on the supporting signature streets. 
 
Repairing continuity is likely to be tailored to each weak link.  Leland Consulting Group 
proposed potential solutions for repairing weak links: 
 
 Pioneer Courthouse, located immediately east of Pioneer Square, is a celebrated historic 
building.  However, the Courthouse is a barrier to retailing.  Its limited use (courts) 
contributes little or nothing to the signature retail district.  A big idea is to purchase or 
lease this building from the federal government and activate it with cultural uses, retail, 
restaurants, and other attractions.  Another idea is to create a local design competition to 
explore possible solutions. 
 
 Banks on key retail corners is a universal issue in most downtowns, particularly as they 
close at or before 6:00 p.m. weekdays and have limited weekend operating hours.  The 
reason is that banks have historically moved into downtowns and retail districts before 
major retailers.  It is not necessary to remove the banks as long as retail continuity can 
be provided.  If retail liner space can be cut into a portion of the bank’s space and made 
accessible from the street, the bank could remain and the signature street can increase 
its retail continuity.  In some cases, it may be appropriate for the city or an agency to 
lease key ground level space and re-tenant that space with the most desired tenants.  
 
A final consideration in the public realm experience is quality of the streetscape itself.  While 
the block-by-block program and Portland Mall Management, Inc. (PMMI) have successfully 
given the transit mall a new facelift, other key areas of the retail core could use the same 
treatment to make the physical realm more appealing. 
Supporting Land Uses 
The success of retail is as good as the size and demographics of the market that support it.  As 
opposed to suburban retail, downtowns tend to have a much more diversified customer base.  
Downtown retailers not only serve nearby residents but also a significant number of employees 
and visitors.  When evaluating a downtown’s potential to establish and sustain a thriving retail 
district, an important rule of thumb is that a downtown resident will support more retail than 
an office worker.  While the number of downtown Portland employees has remained fairly 
steady over the years, the number of residential units and central city residents has 
dramatically increased.  From 2002 to 2007, approximately 7,000 market-rate and affordable 
units were either built, under construction, or on the drawing boards for both the downtown 
and the Pearl District combined7.  
 
However, as noted above, Portland compares unfavorably with the case study retail areas with 
respect to the number of residents in close proximity to its retail core.  It may be important to 
revise the city’s height and FAR limits for downtown, particularly in the West End district as 
part of its emerging retail strategy.  With a significant increase in the FAR limits, considering 
an affordable or workforce housing FAR bonus, site assembly and demolition for downtown 
housing may become more achievable.   
 
                                                
7 Source: Central City Development and Redevelopment Projects.  Portland Business Alliance.  April 2007. 
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Many existing FAR allowances are approximately 9:1 in the West End district, with some bonus 
provisions for housing to bring the FAR to 11:1.  Leland Consulting Group recommends 
allowing an additional 5:1 FAR bonus for affordable housing and an increase in the minimum 
FAR to make the economics of housing development more feasible in the West End.  Consider a 
standard 40,000 square foot downtown block that could develop 360,000 square feet of floor 
area (40,000 x 9) plus a bonus of 80,000 square feet (40,000 x 2), for a total of 440,000 square 
feet.  With a 20,000 square-foot footprint on the upper floors (the footprint of the first two 
floors would likely go street-to-street), a 20-story tower could be developed.   
 
If the FAR limit was raised an additional 5:1, making a 16:1 total FAR, the tower might achieve 
30 or more stories (see Figure 6 below).  Consider the possibility that a portion of the additional 
5:1 FAR might not be an outright allowance, but rather, an opportunity or option to purchase 
that capacity at say, $20,000 per unit.  Using this example, an additional 5:1 FAR could 
generate as much as $3 million (150 additional units, or 10 floors at 15 units per floor, x 
$20,000) that could go into a revolving fund to assist in financing affordable and/or workforce 
housing. 
 
Potential Impacts of Increased Density Bonus 
 
 
 
Retail Mix – Retailer Recruitment and Retention 
Shopping mall and lifestyle center success is highly dependent on management’s ability to 
recruit and lease to a carefully selected mix of retailers.  Selecting the right mix of retailers is 
essential.  National anchors help support independent retailers by generating a large volume of 
foot traffic for retailers in the area.  By combining national destination retailers with regional 
uniqueness and a local downtown flavor, the downtown becomes a one-of-a-kind destination. 
 
Unlike a shopping mall, downtown has highly fractured ownership and challenging spaces to 
lease in terms of size and configuration.  However, aggressive recruitment, coupled with 
financial or amenity incentives, may be able to land the right retail tenants.  To stay 
competitive, the PDC and the PBA began to explore avenues to more aggressively recruit 
preferred retailers.  For three years, the organizations had a retailer recruitment booth at the 
International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) annual conference.  Attracting Brooks 
Brothers to downtown was a result of that effort.  In addition, a downtown retail advocate 
position has been created, jointly funded by the city, PDC, and PBA, to ensure a year-round, 
pro-active recruitment effort.  Retail recruitment requires a long-term commitment to landing 
the right tenant and a collaborative effort by downtown brokers, the PBA, the PDC and other 
private sector partners.   
 
Figure 6 – Source: Leland Consulting Group  
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Given the retail core’s potential to broaden market share and respond to the current economy, 
Leland Consulting Group emphasized that the retail core is undersupplied with affordable 
product offerings.  People living in and near downtown are forced to shop elsewhere when it 
comes to price-sensitive purchases.  Appropriately scaled and designed urban versions of big 
box stores, traditionally located in power centers and near freeways, can be an important part 
of Portland’s retail core, can help attract new spending and reduce leakage to suburban 
locations.  There are proven techniques for bringing big box stores downtown and incorporating 
them into the urban environment.  Affordable fashion retailers such as H&M, Zara, and T.J. 
Maxx, or a general merchandise retailer such as Target, can and would complement the high-
end fashion offerings represented by Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, Brooks Brothers, Mario’s, 
Mercantile, and St. John.  Particularly in an economy in which discount retailers are seeing the 
greatest sales growth, recruitment of such tenants is encouraged. 
Linkages and Gateways 
Other districts and landmarks surrounding the retail core support it and help channel foot and 
automobile traffic towards the retail core.  These districts and landmarks include the 
waterfront, employment districts south of the core, the civic district, the cultural district, the 
Pearl district, and others.  Without critical links between these districts, continuity in the 
downtown experience is lost and the retail core loses in terms of visibility and synergistic 
effects with the other districts.  Figure 7 on the next page shows the relationship between the 
retail core and other downtown districts. 
  
Retail Core in Relationship to Other Downtown Districts 
 
  Figure 7 – Source: Leland Consulting Group  
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There are critical linkages between downtown districts that need strengthening.  These linkages 
can be strengthened via street improvements, public realm improvements, or activation of 
ground floor building uses.  Some important linkages include: 
 
 SW 10th Avenue from SW Alder Street to W Burnside Street.  The retail along SW 10th 
Avenue could be considered “retail light,” with shallow retail spaces filled with 
restaurants, galleries, services, and related storefronts that support livability upstairs.  
The retail would most likely be liner retail (20 to 30 feet deep) and would promote the 
activity and continuity to connect the shopper to the Pearl District.  
 
 SW Broadway Avenue from SW Washington Street to West Burnside Street.  This 
section of Broadway, although not part of the retail core, is an important connection to 
the Pearl district and Old Town/Chinatown. 
 
 SW Broadway Avenue from SW Salmon Street south to the Cultural District.  This 
section of Broadway is an important link to the cultural district and Portland State 
University. 
 
 SW Morrison Street from the retail core to the waterfront.  This connection could be 
strengthened to attract traffic from Naito Parkway, pedestrians at the waterfront, and 
Yamhill Historic district visitors into the retail core. 
 
Furthermore, to signal the entry to downtown Portland’s signature retail district, physical 
gateways at the entries to the four signature retail streets could be established: SW Broadway 
Avenue at SW Washington Street, SW Broadway Avenue at SW Taylor Street, SW Morrison 
Street at SW 10th Avenue and SW Morrison Street at Naito Parkway.  Design competitions 
could provide inspiring physical statements of arrival to Portland’s signature retail district.  
Such competitions could be international, local, or even stem from engagement with local 
schools.  Each gateway could be different, yet still reinforce the signature district brand.   
Marketing and Branding 
Downtowns need to be run in a business-like fashion and, as with any business, marketing is 
absolutely critical.  As retailers across the country struggle, even more promotional 
opportunities and other events will be necessary to help keep the retail core healthy.  Chicago 
has the Magnificent Mile, San Francisco has Union Square, and New York has Fifth Avenue.  
Numerous marketing entities such as the Downtown Marketing Initiative (DMI) and Travel 
Portland (formally the Portland Oregon Visitors Association) help to market downtown, but no 
one marketing campaign focuses exclusively on forming a brand and identity for the retail core.  
The city has a commitment to continue funding for the DMI through 2010 and a focused effort 
led by the DMI, PBA, PDC, and other organizations will work on branding the signature retail 
district as part of the emerging strategy. 
Implementation 
The ultimate success of this strategy lies in equal public and private stakeholder support, 
particularly in how the strategy will be implemented.  An examination of more sustainable 
funding resources and key catalytic redevelopment sites will also be part of the emerging 
strategy and will require significant private sector participation.  To test the ideas presented 
above, the task force members were assigned to one of two subcommittees: physical realm or 
implementation and resources.  Each subcommittee presented a full set of recommendations to 
the task force in June that will form the basis for an implementation strategy with broad-based 
support.  The desired result will ultimately be a more robust strategy with ownership from the 
public and private sectors to carry Portland’s retail core forward in the midst of a challenging 
economic climate. 
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Tax Increment Financing: 
Comparing Approaches in Northwest States 
 
 
Read Stapleton, Senior Planner, BergerABAM – Vancouver, WA 
 
 
 
Over the last 40 years, tax increment financing (TIF) has been a popular tool for local 
governments to use to implement urban redevelopment projects without tapping into local 
general fund coffers.  The use of TIF has expanded and contracted over the years due to a 
number of national and local factors.  Initially, TIF was a means to secure local matching funds 
for federal grants available for urban redevelopment projects.  As federal funding to urban 
renewal agencies became less available and shifted to local cities in the form of block grants in 
the 1970s, the popularity of TIF grew as it became a larger and more critical piece of the 
redevelopment financing pie.  Comparing the approaches that Oregon, Washington and Idaho 
have taken with respect to tax increment financing sheds light on major public policy issues 
with respect to its use. 
 
Using TIF requires a local government, typically under the authority of a redevelopment 
authority or commission, to define a decaying or blighted district where redevelopment is 
desired.  The authority then forms a district with a limited lifespan, typically 20 years, and 
issues debt to finance capital projects in the district that will encourage redevelopment and 
leverage private investment.  Capital projects within a TIF district are constructed with debt 
that is paid off by the increased property taxes of the district after the district is formed.   
 
Establishing the available tax increment to fund such projects first requires a determination of 
the existing tax base of the district.  Once the existing tax base is determined, the authority 
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must estimate the local tax revenue growth that would occur in the district as a result of the 
implementation of targeted capital improvements.   
 
Critical to this determination, both from a legal perspective (as it is a legal requirement in 
many states) and from a political perspective, is the ‘but-for’ determination, which is the 
authority’s determination that the anticipated tax revenue growth in the district would not 
happen, ‘but-for’ the implementation of the planned capital projects funded via TIF.  Satisfying 
this ‘but-for’ condition is critical because it addresses concerns that the payment of TIF project 
debt will come from a new source of revenue rather than revenues that would have been 
created without the district, which would siphon funds that otherwise would have flowed to the 
general fund.   
 
Tax Allocation Financing 
 
A common misconception with TIF is that property owners within the district get special tax 
breaks that allow them to pay lower taxes than those outside. Actually, every owner within the 
TIF district pays full property taxes based on the total fair market value assessments of each 
property at the same tax rates that apply throughout the jurisdiction. But the taxes based on 
the incremental value over the base assessment are simply allocated to the TIF district for use 
within the district.  
 
Therefore, tax increment financing is really tax allocation financing with the increase in property 
taxes received as a result of the improvements used as bootstrap financing for infrastructure 
improvements within the district that enable new development projects to be built.  When the 
district is dissolved at the end of its authorized life, the full tax revenues from both the base 
assessed value and incremental assessed values revert to the general fund and benefit other 
jurisdictions entitled to tax that property.  These include counties and school districts. 
 
Impacts to other taxing districts are a key 
issue with TIF and one that has caused 
significant division in the Pacific Northwest 
and elsewhere.  In Portland, this issue was 
highlighted recently at the Portland City 
Council hearing on the proposal to fund 
improvements to PGE Park to accommodate 
a new major league soccer franchise 
proposed by Shortstop, LLC (Shortstop), a 
group headed by Merritt Paulson, owner of 
the Portland Timbers and Beavers.  Before 
the City Council was a non-binding 
resolution setting the terms of an 
agreement with Shortstop to finance 
improvements to PGE Park for major league 
soccer as well as finance a new Tripe-A 
baseball stadium for the Portland Beavers.   
 
At the hearing, Ted Wheeler, chair of the Multnomah County Commission, testified that early 
analysis of the various funding strategies considered by a citizen’s task force were flawed 
because they did not fully consider the impacts to social services and County-administered 
programs that would be caused by establishing a new urban renewal district around PGE Park.  
This renewal district was being considered as a means to generate $15 million of the funds 
necessary to improve PGE Park for professional soccer.  Wheeler argued that one of the guiding 
principles of the task force, ensuring that the City’s general fund would not be impacted, 
should also have included impacts to the County general fund and school funding.   
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At the heart of Wheeler’s concern was his contention that a new urban renewal district at PGE 
Park would not meet the true ‘but for’ test and that future tax revenues from the district would 
not be ‘new’ tax revenues.  Wheeler raised concerns that the PGE area is not truly blighted and 
that the growth in assessed value (AV) that might occur after improvements to the stadium 
likely would occur without the stadium. Therefore, he argued, the creation of a TIF district at 
PGE Park would siphon tax revenues that should be directed to the County’s general fund.  
With an existing $45-million deficit in the county budget and another $20 million in budget 
cuts anticipated, Wheeler argued that a financing mechanism for the stadium must be revenue 
neutral to the County and schools.  Public debate about Wheeler’s contentions appears to have 
led the City to leave the adoption of a new urban renewal area (URA) for PGE Park 
improvements off the table in the stadium financing resolution. 
 
TIF in Oregon 
 
Following California’s 1952 
lead, Oregon adopted TIF 
enabling legislation in 
1960. Oregon’s adoption of 
TIF provided a way to 
generate local revenues 
that could be used to 
match federal loans and 
grants for urban redevel-
opment as authorized by 
the Federal Housing Act of 
1949.1 Since Oregon’s 
adoption of TIF legislation, 
the state’s use of TIF has 
been widespread. In Port-
land, 17 major redevelop-
ment projects have been 
funded through urban 
renewal dollars and TIF 
since 1958.2  Included on 
this list are such iconic 
projects as the South Auditorium renewal area, Pioneer Courthouse Square, Pioneer Place, 
RiverPlace, the River District (Pearl) and South Waterfront. 
 
Oregon statutes and legal framework for TIF include various limitations and restrictions that 
affect the size and scope of the district.  When deciding the feasibility of the urban renewal 
area, two critical evaluation steps must be resolved. 
 
1.  Determine the available assessed value and land area within the city that can be placed in an 
urban renewal plan area;  
 
ORS 457.420 limits TIF districts in municipalities with a population greater than 50,000 to a 
maximum 15% of the total assessed value (AV) and 15% of the total land area of that 
municipality.  Municipalities with a population of less than 50,000 may not adopt urban 
renewal plan areas that exceed 25% of the total AV and 25% of the land area of that 
municipality.  These limitations are significant for cities such as Portland.  As noted in Table 1, 
                                                
1 Tashman Johnson LLC, Urban Renewal in Oregon, History, Case Studies, Policy Issues, and Latest Developments, 
2002  
2 Craig Wollner, John Provo, Julie Schablisky, Brief History of Urban Renewal in Portland, Oregon, p. 1 
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the City of Portland is close to the maximum area permitted within urban renewal plan areas 
with current plan areas that occupy 14.07% of the total land area in the city.  
 
Table 1: Current PDC Urban Renewal Areas 
Urban Renewal 
Area 
Maximum 
Indebtedness 
Indebtedness 
Issued as of 
06/30/08 
Indebtedness 
Remaining 
Last Date 
to Issue 
Debt 
Acres Included in 
Plan Area 
Airport Way  $72,638,268  $72,638,268  $0  May, 2011  2,726 
Central East Side  $104,979,000  $58,929,592  $46,049,408 
August, 
2018  692 
Downtown 
Waterfront  $165,000,000  $165,000,000  $0  April, 2008  279 
Gateway 
Regional Center  $164,240,000  $16,460,051  $147,779,949  June, 2022  659 
Interstate 
Corridor  $335,000,000  $68,068,575  $266,931,425  June, 2021  3,769 
Lents Town 
Center*  $75,000,000  $45,912,251  $29,087,749  June, 2020  2,707 
North Macadam  $288,562,000  $70,583,661  $217,978,339  June, 2020  402 
Oregon 
Convention 
Center  $167,511,000  $102,633,326  $64,877,674  June, 2013  593 
River District*  $224,780,350  $132,593,966  $92,186,384  June, 2021  309 
South Park 
Blocks  $143,619,000  $72,319,542  $71,299,458  July, 2008  161 
Willamette 
Industrial  $200,000,000  $440,000  $199,560,000 
December, 
2024  758 
Total  $1,941,329,618  $805,579,232  $1,135,750,386     13,055 
Total acres in the City of Portland  92,773 
Percentage of acres in Urban Renewal Areas (Maximum allowed = 15%)  14.07% 
Citywide Acreage Remaining  862.79 
Total Assessed Value in City of Portland (less Excess Value, Used and Not Used)  $38,454,566,429 
Percentage of Frozen Value in Urban Renewal Plan Areas (Max. Allowed = 15%)  10.60% 
Source: Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission (TSCC) Annual Report 2008-2009 
 
2.  Determine the maximum indebtedness of the plan area. 
 
For a municipality to adopt a TIF district, Oregon law (ORS 457.190) requires that the 
municipality first determine the maximum indebtedness of the plan district.  The maximum 
indebtedness is the maximum amount of debt principal permitted within the district and is 
calculated by determining anticipated future incremental increases in assessed valuation 
within it.  
 
Implications of Property Tax Limitation Measures 
 
Over the last 20 years, complications with TIF have arisen from multiple property tax limitation 
measures.  The first, Measure 5, passed in 1990 gradually limited property tax assessment 
rates over a 5-year period to 1.5% of assessed valuation per year.  The measure imposed a rate 
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limit of $10 per $1,000 assessed value for general governmental districts and a rate limit of $5 
per $1,000 assessed value for school districts.   
 
Property tax collections in Oregon were further scaled back in 1996, when voters approved 
Measure 47 which restricted property tax collections by resetting property taxes on personal 
property in 1997-1998 to 90% of the property tax assessment in 1996, and then permitted 
annual increases of no more than 3% in the assessed property values from that point forward, 
with some exceptions for new construction.  
 
In 1997 the Oregon legislature rewrote Measure 47 as Measure 50 in an attempt to clarify that 
Measure 47 would be a limitation on the amount that assessed valuation could increase.  
Measure 50 also revised the urban renewal statutes to require local municipalities to adopt a 
special levy ordinance to ensure the repayment of outstanding debt obligations associated with 
existing urban renewal areas (ORS 457.435).  This provision gave municipalities three different 
options for addressing anticipated urban renewal area budget shortfalls.  The City of Portland 
complied with this state requirement and adopted an ordinance that established a special 
property tax levy to help repay the increment gap in existing urban renewal districts where 
potential revenue shortfalls were anticipated.   
 
Measures 5 and 50 changed the 
rules of the game for TIF in 
Oregon and have forced cities to 
very carefully assess the revenue 
generation potential of a district 
before moving past the feasibility 
stage of plan development.  
Because new development estab-
lishes new assessed values for a 
property, there can be a tremen-
dous property tax upside for 
urban renewal districts that are 
significantly underdeveloped, 
such as the North Macadam 
Urban Renewal Plan area (sub-
sequently called the South 
Waterfront area) in Portland.  
However, using that same 
example, the city is taking a 
much more significant risk that 
market conditions will be able to 
sustain substantial development 
in this relatively small district 
(402-acres) to repay the $288.5 
million of indebtedness estab-
lished for the plan area.  
 
By way of contrast, larger urban 
renewal areas such as the 
Interstate Corridor Urban Ren-
ewal Plan Area in northeast and 
north Portland, carry much less 
inherent risk.  This is due to the 
fact that the plan area encom-
passes 3,769 acres already devel-
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oped, and in an area that has seen substantial real market property value appreciation since 
the approval of Measure 50.  Because Measure 50 has suppressed assessed valuation in the 
Interstate corridor well below real market values for the last 12 years, there is a minimum 
appreciation of approximately 3% per year that can be assumed in the district before factoring 
in new construction. However, the fact that the district is so large makes it difficult to assert 
that a significant causal connection exists between the projects built within the district and the 
increase in property values of other properties in the district.  Thus, the ‘but for’ case becomes 
more difficult to prove in a situation such as the North Interstate Urban Renewal Area. 
 
In the case of South Waterfront, the Portland 
Development Commission (PDC) was savvy to the 
risks associated with the North Macadam Urban 
Renewal Area and established an extensive 
development agreement with private developers in 
the district and Oregon Health Sciences University 
(OHSU) to hedge its risk.  The South Waterfront 
development agreement established obligations of all 
development interests in the plan area and PDC.  
This development agreement included binding 
commitments of the private development interests to 
commit resources and provide personal guarantees 
to add value to the district according to a defined 
schedule.3  If the assessment value appreciation schedule is not achieved, then the private 
development interests are responsible for paying the PDC the amount of the revenue shortfall 
from the district.4 The gap obligation schedule required $2.6 million by fiscal year 2008-2009 
and $4.3 million for fiscal year 2009-2010.  The actual tax revenue increment that has been 
achieved to date is $5.1 million, so the district is currently well ahead of the increment revenue 
schedule.5  However, this gap is likely to narrow quickly when in fiscal year 2010-2011 the 
private development interests are required to meet a $7.4M TIF revenue budget for the district. 
                                                
3 South Waterfront Central District Project Development Agreement; The Portland Development Commission, 
Oregon Health & Science University, River Campus Investors, LLC, North Macadam Investors, LLC, Block 39, 
LLC, August 22, 2003 
4 South Waterfront Central District Project Development Agreement, August 22, 2003, p. 73 and Exhibit V 
5 Faye Brown, Portland Development Commission, Personal Communication, June 15, 2009 
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In June 2008, the Portland City Council approved an ordinance that would amend the 
boundaries, expand the indebtedness, and extend the duration of the River District URA, a 
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360-acre area that includes Portland’s Pearl District in downtown Portland. These amend-
ments included spending $19 million from the River District to build an elementary school and 
community center 15 miles away in the David Douglas School District, located east of I-205 in 
outer southeast Portland.  A group of former Portland Development Commission members and 
staff, including a former PDC chairman, organized as Friends of Urban Renewal (FOUR), filed a 
lawsuit challenging the decision. In January 2009, the State Board of Land Use Appeals (LUBA) 
ruled on the central legal question of whether establishing a satellite district violated the state's 
urban renewal law. LUBA found that it was "permissible under ORS chapter 457 to create an 
urban renewal area and then later add geographically noncontiguous areas to that urban 
renewal area."  
 
LUBA agreed with the City's description of the proposed school site as blighted and disagreed 
with the critics' argument that the City wasn't allowed to pay for construction of a public 
school. But the board agreed with FOUR that the City failed to show how a new school in the 
David Douglas School District would benefit other properties in the River District in downtown 
Portland. LUBA opined that:  
 
"While the social justice concerns that presumably underlie the city's position are entirely 
laudable, the record does not include substantial evidence –– evidence a reasonable 
person would rely on –– demonstrating that the proposed public school/community facility 
'serves or benefits' any part of the central city portion of the urban renewal area." 
 
As a result, LUBA remanded the proposed expansion back to City Council for further work. The 
LUBA ruling has put several major redevelopment projects that were included in the River 
District amendments on hold. Even if the Council amends the ordinance and reauthorizes the 
satellite expansion of the district, a letter from FOUR to the City Council outlines potential 
grounds for challenging it again and the group remains in a standoff with Council. FOUR’s 
June 17, 2009 letter6 charges that the City’s plan fails to demonstrate that the River District 
remains blighted, that many of the proposed projects do not address blight, and that in some 
instances projects are addressed only by generic categories and lack specificity (i.e. “Other 
Public Improvements” or “Other Affordable Housing”).  The FOUR letter holds open the 
possibility of a further appeal of a council amendment which could take several months to 
resolve and could potentially result in a ruling that the River District is no longer blighted, 
meaning that the maximum indebtedness of the district could not be increased to permit 
additional debt issuance and additional projects.  
                                                
6 http://www.portlandtribune.com/documents/efiles/City%20Council%20letter.pdf  
“Our objections to the Amended Plan, as stated in the attached document, are summarized as follows: 
 
1. The report on the Amended Plan does not demonstrate that the River District as a whole is blighted. It 
highlights instances of blight, but the Report shows that major, important areas are no longer blighted. The 
notion of the River District being blighted belies the fact that the District has been substantially completed. A 
person on the street, who knows the Area, would be incredulous--even after reading the Report—that the 
Area is still blighted after 10 years of successful effort. 
 
2. Many of the urban renewal projects proposed do not address conditions of blight. 
For example, while affordable housing is an important objective city-wide, the lack of affordable housing is 
not a condition of blight. The streetcar projects authorized in the Amended Plan do not respond to a condition 
of blight such as inadequate transit service. While job creation is a major objective for the city and the region, 
the major expenditure for economic development in the Area are not tied to conditions of blight in the Area. 
 
3. Major projects with very high costs are described so vaguely that citizens really have no way to know what 
they are paying for. The projects below are given virtually no descriptions: 
• “Other Public Improvements,” at a projected cost of $12,775,702 
• “Other Affordable Housing,” at a projected cost of $50,219,627, 
• “Other Commercial Redevelopment/Revitalization,” at a projected cost of $37,775,702 and 
• “Other Economic Development,” at a projected cost of $44,025,702” 
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Washington 
 
 
Concern over the impacts of TIF on taxing districts and schools has also had a substantial 
impact on the application of TIF north of the Columbia River in Washington, where a dispute in 
1993 ultimately ended in a legal battle that invalidated the state’s TIF enabling legislation.  The 
Washington State Supreme Court ruled in Spokane v. Leonard (1995) that the 1982 
Community Redevelopment Financing Act (CRFA) violated constitutional protections of school 
financing.7   
 
The public project behind Spokane v. Leonard was a plan by the City of Spokane to improve a 
seven square block area surrounding Bernard Street in downtown Spokane.  In 1993, the City 
adopted ordinances to initiate street improvements including curbs, gutters, storm drainage, 
sidewalks, street lighting, and street trees, all totaling $850,000.  In July of that year, a 
property owner in the newly formed apportionment district, Margaret Leonard, objected to the 
City’s plan and filed a declaratory action against the City. Two months later, Spokane County, 
a taxing district that would have seen revenues diverted, intervened in the lawsuit to argue 
against the constitutionality of the CRFA.  After nearly 2 years of working its way through the 
courts, in July 1995, a trial court ruled that the CRFA violated article IX, section 2 of the 
Washington State constitution, which states that: 
 
“The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.  
The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, 
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established.  But the 
entire revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common 
schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of common schools.” 
 
Since the Spokane v. Leonard decision, the Washington state legislature has delicately danced 
around the school finance issue with a rewrite of the CRFA in 2001, and then again with the 
drafting of subsequent enabling legislation for other forms of TIF programs.  The most recent of 
these programs, the Local Infrastructure Financing Tool (LIFT) program, adopted in 2006, and 
the Local Revitalization Finance (LRF) program adopted this past April, are still in their  
                                                
7 Jeffrey C. Nave, Foster Pepper & Shefelman PLLC, Tax Increment Financing Resurrected, Municipal & Public 
Finance News, July 2001, p. 1 
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infancies and the success of these programs is still being measured.  However, both programs 
have been carefully structured to not require mandatory participation of the school district or 
other taxing districts to avoid conflicts similar to those expressed by Ted Wheeler at Portland 
City Council. 
 
The LIFT program was designed as a pilot program that required 
local municipalities to apply to a state Community Economic 
Revitalization Board (CERB) for approval of a revenue develop-
ment area proposal. The CERB board reviewed applications 
annually. While the LIFT program followed the same basic 
premise of conventional TIF programs, it was different in a num-
ber of ways. 
 
 
1. The LIFT legislation was a pilot program and did not give independent authority to local 
jurisdictions to adopt TIF districts. Rather, an application to establish a revenue 
development had to be submitted to the state Community Economic Revitalization 
Board (CERB) that reviewed and approved a limited number of applications annually in 
a competitive process.  
 
2. A component of the application to the CERB board required verification that third party 
taxing districts would agree to participate in the district.  An agreement to participate 
from a third party taxing district was a commitment that the district would agree to 
cede 75% of its share of incremental property tax revenues generated over and above 
the base revenues generated at the time of the revenue development area formation.  
Schools were excluded from this equation, so the primary taxing district whose 
authorization was required was the county.  Such taxing districts were allowed to set a 
limit on the total amount they cede to the revenue development area, as a condition of 
their participation. This provision placed an especially high burden of proof on the ‘but-
for’ test requiring the sponsoring jurisdiction to make a strong case that the proposed 
project is critical to revitalization and that incremental tax revenues would truly be a 
direct result of the funded capital projects.  
 
3. The legislation permits the local municipality to establish a sales and use tax that is 
taken from the state’s share of the sales and use taxes generated within the revenue 
development area.  This sales and use tax is essentially a fractional rebate, for lack of a 
better term, on the 6.5% state share of the sales tax (local levies generally bring the 
total sales tax to just over 8%).  The rebate on the state sales tax is then returned to the 
local jurisdiction quarterly for repayment of debt issued for public improvements in the 
district. This sales and use tax provision includes the sales and use tax on private 
construction costs, which can be significant.   
 
4. The LIFT legislation caps the amount of annual state sales tax that can be returned to 
the LIFT districts annually at $5 million.  This total annual sum is to be divided among 
all of the projects statewide granted LIFT approval by the CERB board.      
 
 
One project that was approved by the CERB to receive up to $500,000 in annual sales and use 
tax rebates is a redevelopment project in downtown Vancouver called Riverwest.  Riverwest is 
mixed-use project planned on a former car dealership site by Killian Pacific, a Portland-
Vancouver real estate developer, and by the Fort Vancouver Regional Library District.  The 
project is planned to consist of a new civic plaza, 200 multi-family residential units, 100,000 
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square feet of office space, 17,000 square feet of retail space, a 112-room hotel, and a 700-
space underground parking garage.8    
 
 
 
 
 
Because the car dealership was no longer operating at the time the revenue development area 
ordinance was adopted by the City of Vancouver, there were no current sales and use taxes 
being generated from the site, thus making the new sales tax increment easy to determine.  For 
the project, all sales and use taxes generated from the revenue development area will be 
subject to the 0.3% tax that is returned to the City of Vancouver from the state.  Tentative 
private construction costs for the project are approximately $200 million. Therefore, the sales 
and use tax rebate on construction costs alone would be approximately $600,000 (0.003 x 
$200,000,000).  While it is not anticipated that the full $600,000 would be generated in single 
fiscal year, if it were, the excess $100,000 (above the $500,000 annual maximum increment) 
could be rolled forward to the following year.  This represents a substantial sum to collect at 
the onset of a project, a time when most TIF districts struggle to generate substantial 
incremental tax increases.   
 
                                                
8 City of Vancouver Website; Accessed on March 30, 2009 at: 
http://www.cityofvancouver.us/econdev.asp?menuid=10464&submenuID=10525&projectID=26994 
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The LIFT financing for the project is intended to construct the $15 million parking garage that 
is proposed with the project.  The adopting ordinance for the LIFT district identifies a 25-year 
period for the lifespan of the district.  Future incremental tax revenues from the Riverwest 
project will include incremental property tax revenues ceded by the Fort Vancouver Regional 
Library District, Clark County, and the Port of Vancouver, all of whom agreed to participate in 
the district.9    
 
 
From LIFT to LRF 
In April of this year, the Washington State legislature adopted Senate Bill 5045, an update to 
the LIFT program.  With SB 5045, the legislature abandoned the LIFT moniker and labeled the 
new program Local Revitalization Financing (LRF).  The new LRF program is very similar to the 
LIFT program in that it permits a local jurisdiction to issue debt repaid by incremental 
revenues from sales tax and property tax increments recovered within a revitalization area.  
However, rather than applying to the CERB board for approval through a competitive process, 
the LRF legislation now permits local juris-
dictions to submit applications for LRF prog-
rams, to be accepted on a first-come first-serve 
basis up to the maximum allowable cap per year.  
Whereas the LIFT program required review and 
approval by the CERB board, the LRF program 
requires applicants to submit applications to the 
state Department of Revenue (DOR) for review 
and approval. SB 5045 specifically approved 
seven demonstration projects across the state to 
implement LRF areas totaling $2.25M annually.  
These approved projects included the Vancouver 
Columbia Waterfront redevelopment project, a 
                                                
9 Steve Burdick, Killian Pacific, March 30, 2009 Interview. 
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35-acre mixed use redevelopment proposed by Gramor Development and a group of local 
investors on the former Boise-Cascade paper manufacturing facility in downtown Vancouver.     
 
 
In addition to the $2.25 million 
annual funding that was allocated 
to the seven demonstration pro-
jects, SB 5045 authorized an add-
itional $2.5 million of LRF funding 
per year, with a maximum annual 
allocation per project of $500,000. 
The DOR will begin accepting app-
lications for LRF programs for 
non-demonstration projects begin-
ning September 1, 2009. 
 
 
 
Idaho 
 
Compared to its neighbors to the 
west, Idaho’s TIF program has 
faced fewer obstacles in the way of 
property tax limitation measures, 
litigation attacking constitution-
ality and the intervention of 
political interests. The state’s leg-
islation also permits private devel-
opers to participate directly in the recovery of established incremental property tax revenues if 
designated improvements are privately funded, a significant development enticement not found 
in Oregon or Washington.  Some basic facets of the Idaho program and Idaho tax structure 
make the state’s revenue allocation program a much more straightforward and arguably more 
market flexible program than than in either in Oregon or Washington.   
 
First, Idaho did not experience the wave of property tax limitation measures that swept Oregon 
in the 1990s. Therefore, municipalities with adopted revenue allocation areas have not had to 
contend with anticipated budget shortfalls due to changes in the property tax collection 
methods.  As a result, it has not been necessary for the state to develop various alternative 
levies and other mechanisms to ensure that urban renewal areas have the capacity to repay 
their debt obligations. 
 
Second, revenue allocation areas can be adopted both within an urban renewal plan area and 
also within something called a ‘competitively disadvantaged border community area’. Unlike an 
urban renewal plan area, which can only be adopted upon a finding of blight within the 
proposed plan area, a competitively disadvantaged border community area can be established 
in a county or city location that is at least 40 acres and is within 25 miles of a state or 
international border.  In order to adopt a competitively disadvantaged border community area, 
the municipality must find that the proposed revenue allocation area is otherwise 
disadvantaged for economic development because of disparities in sales tax, income tax, 
property tax, population, or geography.  This provision has been used to adopt plan districts in 
border communities such as Moscow, Post Falls and Coeur D’Alene, where these communities 
compete with Washington cities, primarily in the greater Spokane area. 
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Artist’s Rendering - Tullamore Master Planned Development in the East Post Falls, ID URA 
 
Lastly, Idaho’s revenue allocation provisions allow for private development interests to be 
repaid directly from the increment funds generated in the district if the developer completes 
designated capital projects identified in the plan.  This program feature provides significant 
benefit to the urban renewal agencies and local municipalities because it provides the option of 
taking the finance risk out of the hands of the local urban renewal agency if a developer is 
willing to finance improvements privately.  It is a significant upside to developers who, knowing 
they can recapture particular capital expenditures towards public infrastructure with 
incremental property tax revenues, may be more likely to move forward with the project and 
more likely to secure advantageous financing than would otherwise be the case. The 
particulars of how the private developer is repaid, including whether or not revenue allocation 
reimbursements cover costs of financing, are typically handled in a development agreement or 
owner participation agreement between the urban renewal agency and the developer.10  
 
While the Idaho program remains the least altered urban renewal program in the Northwest, it 
has not been impervious to public criticism or legal challenge. There are currently two legal 
challenges in the Idaho courts regarding urban renewal plans in the cities of Rexburg and 
Nampa where revenue allocation areas were proposed to build a $6.3 million public swimming 
pool and a $68 million police station and library, respectively. The primary contention of the 
appellants in these challenges is that the urban renewal agency is essentially an alter ego of 
the city and should not be allowed to issue long-term debt without a two-thirds vote of the city, 
which is otherwise required of municipalities by the Idaho constitution.11  This issue had been 
previously settled by a 1972 Idaho Supreme Court Case titled Boise Redevelopment Agency 
(BRA) v. Yick Kong Corp. [94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972)], which found that the urban 
renewal agency was a unique entity from the authorizing municipality and that debt issued by 
the urban renewal agency is not subject to two-thirds voter approval as is required of 
municipalities.12 As a consequence, the cases in Rexburg and Nampa are being monitored 
closely by urban renewal agencies across Idaho as they could significantly hamstring the 
political process of implementing revenue allocation areas in the future. 
 
                                                
10 Ryan Armbruster, Elam & Burke Attorneys at Law, Interview, March 24, 2009 
11 Boise Weekly, Cities in Disguise, August 27, 2008, Accessed on March 29, 2009: 
http://www.boiseweekly.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=316825 
12 Ryan Armbruster, Elam & Burke Attorneys at Law, Interview March 24, 2009 
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Conclusion 
 
In spite of the numerous structural differences that exist between the TIF programs in the 
Northwest, current day efforts to thwart these programs have many common threads.  In the 
Nampa and Rexberg, Idaho court cases, there is an underlying concern of the appellants that 
these projects are public service projects designed to benefit the greater community and are not 
truly economic development projects that benefit the URA.  This argument draws a close 
parallel to one of the contested issues raised in the River District debate by the FOUR group, 
who argued that construction of the planned elementary school lacked a nexus to the economic 
development of the remainder of the district.   
 
Additionally, TIF opponents commonly cite concerns that tax revenues grown out of a TIF 
district may not truly be a result of improvements planned for the district.  Washington State 
was so keenly aware of this concern (thanks to the Spokane v. Leonard decision) that it even 
wrote an opt-out clause to its current enabling legislation to permit taxing districts to opt out of 
participation in the district.  This is somewhat ironic, because TIF district plans by design 
should meet the ‘but for’ test as a prerequisite for formation.  However, the lure of using TIF to 
finance various pet projects has enticed many URA authorities to pursue projects that test the 
boundaries of urban renewal.  Examples of this include the creation of a satellite district to 
build a new school 15 miles away or the construction of sports stadiums with marginal 
economic impact.  As municipalities such as Portland continue to push the envelope of urban 
renewal to include such projects, one can expect challenges to continue from development 
interests, counties, school districts, and other taxing jurisdictions with a substantial stake in 
the process. 
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Housing Market Analysis 
 
By Scott Aster, Certificate of Real Estate Development Graduate Student & 
Oregon Association of Realtors [OAR] Fellow 
 
 
Median Home Values of Existing Detached Homes 
  U.S. West 
Portland 
Metro Area 
May 2008 Median Sales Price 
 $        
206,000  
 $      
290,200  
 $           
297,500  
May 2009 Median Sales Price 
 $        
172,900  
 $      
202,200  
 $           
259,000  
% Change in Median Sales Price -16.1% -30.3% -12.9% 
% Change in Number of Sales 
May[June??] 2008-2009 -3.0% -10.6% -27.3% 
Source: National Association of Realtors (May 2009) and RMLS (May 2009) 
 
The housing market statistics of the second quarter of 2009 reflect the continued downward 
trend in home prices nationwide.  Median home prices were down 16.1% annually in May, and 
30.3% for the western part of the nation.  According to May’s Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller 
index, the metro areas with the greatest annual depreciation rates are Phoenix (-35%), Las 
Vegas (-32%), San Francisco (-28%), and Miami (-27%).  However, prices are still substantially 
higher than they were before the housing bubble. For Portland, the index based on a home 
valued at $100,000 in 2000 stood at $146,850 at the end of April 2009. RealtyTrac’s May 
foreclosure report put Oregon at 22nd in the nation for notices of default, auctions and other 
forms of foreclosure action. The foreclosure activity count indicates that there are 3,067 
foreclosure properties representing one in every 524 housing units within the state.  The 
number of building permits issued was down 43% nationally, with a reduction of 45% in 
Oregon.   
 
Source: http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/MetroPrice 
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              Building Permits Issued 
  Year to Date 
  SINGLE-FAMILY MULTIFAMILY 
  May-
09 
May-
08 
PCT 
CHG 
May-
09 
May-
08 
PCT 
CHG 
UNITED STATES    
156.9  
  
273.8  
-43%     
59.2  
  
139.0  
-57% 
 OREGON 
     
2.13  
    
3.90  -45% 
    
1.27  
    
1.83  -31% 
Bend OR 
     
0.14  
    
0.31  -56% 
    
0.03  
    
0.07  -60% 
Corvallis OR 
     
0.01  
    
0.01  0% -    -    -     
Eugene-Springfield OR 
     
0.16  
    
0.32  -51% 
    
0.05  
    
0.09  -44% 
Medford OR 
     
0.12  
    
0.18  -31% 
    
0.01  
    
0.01  80% 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA 
     
1.11  
    
2.07  -47% 
    
0.45  
    
1.54  -71% 
Salem OR 
     
0.11  
    
0.27  -60% 
    
0.09  
    
0.10  -8% 
 
Portland 
The number of Portland metropolitan area home sales increased by 67% over the first quarter, 
as buyers closed purchases on 3,342 existing homes.  However, the results are still down 7% 
from the previous year.  Median prices for the second quarter were at $255,550, a slight 
increase over the previous quarter, but a 13% reduction annually.  Though prices are still 
being marked down, with average sales taking place at 91.75% of the original list price, sellers 
saw an improvement of 0.12% annually.  Sellers in the Portland area, on average, have their 
homes on the market for 77 days before closing, reflecting a two-week increase from 2008.  
Price per-square-foot values appear to have stabilized at $136, a slight increase of 2% from the 
previous quarter.  However, this reflects a 13% decrease annually. 
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Median Sales Price & Number of Homes Sales Per Quarter - Existing Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
Sale Price/Original List Price & Average Days on Market – Existing Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County)  
8-Year outlook for Median Sales Price  
& Number of transactions 
 
1st Quarter Median Price: $255,550 
Quarterly % Change: 0.20% 
Annual % Change: -13.40% 
 
Number of Transactions: 3,342 
Quarterly % Change: 67.44% 
Annual % Change: -6.86% 
8-Year outlook for Average DOM and Sales 
Price/Original List Price ratio 
1st Quarter Sale/Original ratio: 91.75 
Quarterly % Change: 1.89% 
Annual % Change: 0.00% 
 
Days on Market: 77 
Quarterly % Change:-11.49% 
Annual % Change: 22.22% 
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Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, some Portland submarkets experienced quarterly price 
appreciation, although the mix of houses actually sold in different time periods may account 
for the differences.  Columbia County home prices rose at 11.14% followed by Southeast 
Portland at 9.43%.  
 
Conversely, the Beaverton/Aloha area experienced the highest depreciation rate at (-8.2%), 
followed by Tigard/Wilsonville at (-7.43%) and Mt. Hood (-7.39%).  However, annual results are 
negative for all Portland submarkets.  Lake Oswego (-20.2%), Oregon City/Canby (-16.5%), and 
Beaverton/Aloha (16.3%) home values decreased the most from the previous year.  Mt Hood (-
3.4%) and West Portland (-4.0%) home values depreciated the least from 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median Sales Price & Number of Transactions – New Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
8-Year outlook for new construction             
single-family home sales 
 
1st Quarter Median Price: $339,500 
Quarterly % Change: -5.00% 
Annual % Change: -8.24% 
 
Number of Transactions: 384 
Quarterly % Change: 46.57% 
Annual % Change: -50.47% 
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Vancouver 
Vancouver’s second quarter statistics indicate a continuance of the city’s decreasing home 
values.  Vancouver’s median home price was $195,000 resulting in depreciation rates of (-5%) 
quarterly and (-17%) annually.  On a positive note, the number of home sales increased to 650, 
up 71% quarterly and 14% annually.  However, the number of days on the market is up to 100, 
a 64% increase from 2008. 
 
 
In the suburbs of Clark County, home prices have stabilized at $245,000 as they remained 
within a percentage point of the previous quarter’s median price.  However, an annual outlook 
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indicates that home prices are down 11% from 2008.  Similar to Vancouver, the number of 
home transactions in the Clark County suburbs is up 48% for the quarter and 19% annually.  
But the number of days on the market has increased 25% annually and is up to 100.  
 
 
 
The Vancouver/Clark County submarket is primarily down for the quarter.  However, the East 
Heights area had a stronger quarter with an appreciation rate of 33%.  Downtown Vancouver 
and Brush Prairie also had solid quarters with appreciation rates of 21% and 14%.  Conversely, 
the Lincoln/Hazel Dell area had the highest depreciation rate at (-19%) followed by North 
Salmon Creek and Northeast Heights at (-14%) and (-11%).  Annual changes show that only 
Five Corners had an increase in home values, of 14%.  The rest of the submarket depreciated 
led by North Felida at (-33%). 
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Condominium and Attached Market1 
The number of condominium sales in the Portland metropolitan market is up from the previous 
quarter but is still down significantly from 2008.  Across the metropolitan area, the number of 
sales is up 55% for the quarter while the number of Vancouver sales increased 13%.  The 
Portland metropolitan area’s price per square foot is at $208, an 8% quarterly increase but 5% 
annual decrease.  The median price per Portland condominium unit is $200,000, the same as 
the first quarter.  Vancouver, at a price per square foot of $133, is up 15% for the quarter but 
down 13% for the year.  Vancouver’s median price per condominium is up to $155,450 an 
increase of 14% for the quarter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to the 
condominium market, results for single-family attached housing are up for the quarter but 
down annually.  The number of 
attached home sales in the 
Portland metropolitan area 
increased 73% from the first 
quarter to 291.  However, the 
number of sales of attached 
homes is down -28% annually 
with a median price of $211,000.  
The Vancouver area saw both 
quarterly (+130%) and annual 
(+25%) increases as the number 
of attached homes sold increase-
ed to 76.  For Portland, price-per-
square-foot numbers ($139) 
stayed the same from the first quarter but decreased by 11% annually.  Vancouver, at $107 per 
square foot, saw a quarterly increase of 11% but an annual decrease of (-20%).  The median 
price for attached homes in Vancouver was $169,900. 
                                                
1 RMLS defines attached as “an element of the residence construction is shared with another property.  
Condominiums excluded.  Condominiums are defined as an attached or stand-alone residence for which the owner 
has title to the space inside the unit and shares common spaces with other unit owners in accordance with specific 
legal guidelines. 
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Central Oregon 
Both Bend and Redmond experienced a slight increase from the previous year with respect to 
the number of homes sold. Bend home sales are up 14% to 358 while Redmond’s increased 
18% to 153.  The number of days on the market declined to 170 for Bend while remaining at 
182 for Redmond.  However, the median home prices declined significantly for both Central 
Oregon submarkets.  Bend home prices plummeted (-32%) to $209,500 while Redmond prices 
slipped (-29% to $160,000. Price-per-square-foot numbers also declined significantly for Bend 
and Redmond at $124 and $100.   .   
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As it is commonly reported in Central Oregon’s reports, the housing stock is separated by lot size – properties under 
one acre and those between one and five acres.  Price per square foot is provided to control for lot size between both 
categories.  Second quarter statistics are almost entirely negative for Central Oregon homes lying on acreage.  Bend 
transactions declined almost (-10% ) from 2008 while Redmond experienced a slight increase.  Meanwhile, Bend 
home prices plummeted (-21%) to $399,900 while Redmond prices slipped (-5%) to $347,500.  Price per square foot 
is down to $160 for Bend and $171 for Redmond.  The number of days on the market increased significantly for 
both areas as Bend is up to 209 and Redmond is at 183. 
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Willamette Valley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second quarter results for the Willamette Valley are consistent with those of the northern parts 
of the state.  All Willamette Valley submarkets experienced annual depreciation on existing 
home prices.   
 
Lane County has once again suffered the worst quarter in the valley with declining prices of     
(-20%) annually followed closely by Keizer at (-19.8%).  
 
Linn County was once again the stronger submarket but still suffered a (-6.6% ) depreciation 
rate.  The number of transactions over the past year also declined for these areas at (-3%) for 
Lane County and (-23%) for Keizer.   
 
Although the rest of the valley experienced less depreciation, the number of days on the market 
increased while the number of transactions decreased annually in all submarkets.   
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Salem 
 
Salem’s housing market continues to suffer annual deprecation of home prices, fewer home 
transactions, and a greater number of days on the market.  Prices declined (-8%) from the 
previous year to $190,000.  Meanwhile, the number of average days on the market increased to 
141, over four and a half months.  The number of transactions declined (-16%) from the 
previous year to 385. 
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Eugene/Springfield 
 
The Eugene/Springfield area experienced declining home prices as well as fewer transactions 
relative to the second quarter of 2008.  The number of transactions fell 4% annually to 488 
while the median price was down 11% at $213,375.  Sellers currently have their houses on the 
market for 83 days before closing and are only realizing 78% of their original listing price on 
the sale.   
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Portland Apartment Market 
 
 
 
According to Norris, Beggs & Simpson’s second quarter 2009 multifamily report, the overall 
multifamily vacancy rate has increased in the second quarter to 5.03% compared to 3.46% this 
time last year, which is still much lower than other markets. The average rents for the quarter 
are $682 ($0.97/SF) for a 1BR/1BA, $720 ($0.81/SF) for a 2BR/1BA, $876 ($0.85) for a 
2BR/BA and $972 ($0.78) for a 3 BR/2BA.  These numbers are up slightly from the previous 
quarter.  Average 2BR/2BA new units rent for $1,200 per unit, an increase of $21 over last 
quarter.  Seasoned 2 BR/2BA units rent for an average $824 per unit, which is an increase of 
only $2 over last quarter.     
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Second Quarter, 2009,  
*Price per square foot shown in white 
 
 
Source:  Norris & Stevens "Portland Metro Area Multifamily Report, Second Quarter 2009" 
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*Based on 1BR rate 
**2009 estimated. 
Source:  Brokers, Gary Winkler, and Beth DuPont, Colliers, "Portland Multifamily Private Capital News, Year End 2008" 
 
The SE Portland submarket shows the highest total vacancy rate at 7.37%, while 
Gresham/Troutdale has the lowest submarket vacancy at 3.54%. 
 
 
 
 Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Second Quarter, 2009 
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According to Colliers International, the high local unemployment rates are having a strong 
negative impact on vacancies.  Vacancies are up not because of residents moving away from 
Portland but due to tenants doubling up, moving in with family, or moving into single-family 
rental homes. 
 
According to Mark Barry, condo conversions are also having an impact on vacancy rates.  He 
estimates a current 2.5 to 3.5 years of inventory in the condominium market.  He expects to 
see between 2,500 and 3,500 new apartment units in 2009 as some investors take advantage 
of lower labor and material prices and less competition for high density sites from the condo 
and row house developers.   
 
The threat of fleeing tenants has caused some landlords to offer lower rents, one or two months 
worth of concessions as well as free parking.  Colliers International states in its midyear report 
that, “some new buildings even guarantee that if a tenant loses his/her job, they can end their 
lease agreement without penalties, early termination fees or adverse impact on credit.” The 
total discount of the net effective rent with parking and concessions in select buildings 
throughout the metro area range from 5.6% to 16.8%.  As the chart below shows, rents have 
increased significantly since 2005 while vacancy decreased.  Brokers at Colliers expect this 
trend to change in the coming year.   
      
 
Source:  Mark D Barry, the Barry Apartment Report, Winter 2009     
 
 
 
Most experts forecast an increase in cap rates, which will decrease the market value of 
apartment buildings, especially those that were recently purchased.  Another challenge that 
investors face, as noted by Mark Barry, is an increase in utility costs of 11% for water and 
sewer, 14% for electric and natural gas, and 10% for garbage, which will increase operating 
expenses.       
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Source:  Mark D Barry, the Barry Apartment Report, Winter 2009 
 
 
 
The above graph based on the figures reported by Mark Barry, shows the inverse relationship 
between the median sales price and the cap rate of sales from 2002 to 2008, which illustrates 
how big the bubble has been.  The following graph, produced by Colliers, gives an example of 
how a rising cap rate will affect property values, and gives an indication of the expected trend 
reversal, until we reach the historical average 7% to 9% cap rate.  With lower property values 
as a result of increasing cap rates owners may be reluctant to sell and buyers may wait for 
further declines, which will reduce the number of transactions in the coming year.  Norris, 
Beggs & Simpson notes that “cap rates will be calculated more conservatively with much more 
scrutiny on underwriting, in-place income, historic performance, cost of capital and market 
stability. 
 
Source:  Colliers, "Portland Multifamily Private Capital News, Year End 2008" 
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Office Market Analysis 
April Chastain, RMLS Fellow & Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
Portland Office Market 
 
 
Most brokers agree that the office market has worsened this quarter over last, especially in the 
suburbs, with new projects delivering vacant space to areas that already have high vacancy 
rates. CB Richard Ellis reports that “Portland’s office market experienced 522,785 SF of 
negative net absorption, which is the worst on record, surpassing 4Q2001.” 
 
The Portland Business Journal1 recently reported that Daimler Trucks, formerly Freightliner 
LLC, wants to sublease 111,409 square feet of office space in Montgomery Park, which it plans 
to vacate in order to consolidate its remaining office employees at the Swan Island 
headquarters. The lease expires December 31, 2011.  Nautilus Inc. also plans to vacate nearly 
400,000 square feet at its headquarters in Vancouver.  Both are large, unique spaces, making 
them hard to lease.  However, their vacancy is not expected to decrease asking prices in the 
area for small office space, as these larger office spaces would attract different tenants.   
 
Displaying some optimism, Grubb & Ellis notes a survey by Moody’s Economy.com2 which 
forecasts that Oregon will be one of the top five states to lead the recovery with its high-tech 
industries and abundant, highly-educated, young creative class of available employees.  Grubb 
& Ellis also notes the City of Portland’s goal, as spelled out in its recently released five-year 
economic development plan, of becoming the capital of the global green economy, adding 
10,000 jobs over the next five years in specific industries; Clean Tech and Sustainable 
Industries, Activewear, Software and Advanced Manufacturing.   
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Second Quarter 2009 Statistics 
                                                
1 “Big spaces flood cities”, Portland Business Journal 
2 Oregon could lead nation out of recession, Moody's says 
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OFFICE  Q2-093 
 CB Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman 
& 
Wakefield 
Grubb 
& Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-Wide Vacancy 14% 14.9% 14% 16% 14.6% 
Previous Quarter 13.0% 14.0% 13.0% 15.0% 13.5% 
Second Quarter 2008 10.5% 11.4% 11.3% 13.2% 11.4% 
Second Quarter 2007 11.6% 11.3% 12.3% 14.1% 12.0% 
CBD and Downtown Vacancy 8.9% 10.9% 8.5% 10.3% 9.6% 
Previous Quarter 8.0% 10.2% 8.3% 10.5% 9.3% 
Second Quarter 2008 7.8% 9.1% 7.8% 9.8% 8.5% 
Second Quarter 2007 8.5% 9.5% 9.1% 12.2% 9.3% 
CBD Class A Vacancy  8.6% 6.1% 6.3% 6.3% 
Previous Quarter 5.5% 8.3% 6.5% 6.2% 6.4% 
Second Quarter 2008 5.3% 6.2% 4.9% 6.5% 5.8% 
Second Quarter 2007 4.7% 6.8% 6.8% 5.9% 6.4% 
CBD Class A Asking Rents  $26.20  $24.68 N/A $25.44 
Previous Quarter $26.89 $27.62 $27.02 N/A $27.02 
Second Quarter 2008 $27.04 $26.49 $25.94 N/A $26.49 
Second Quarter 2007 $23.42 $24.75 $24.75 N/A $24.75 
Suburban Vacancy 19.3% 18.7% 18.1% 19.1% 18.9% 
Previous Quarter 17.2% 16.7% 15.7% 17.1% 16.9% 
Second Quarter 2008 13.0% 13.5% 13.4% 15.0% 13.5% 
Second Quarter 2007 14.4% 13.2% 14.2% 16.0% 14.3% 
Suburban Class A Vacancy N/A 20.3% 19.5% N/A 19.9% 
Previous Quarter N/A 18.3% 17.3% 17.5% 17.5% 
Second Quarter 2008 N/A 14.0% 14.9% N/A 14.5% 
Second Quarter 2007 N/A 12.6% 14.1% N/A 13.4% 
Suburban Class A Asking 
Rents N/A $23.59  $23.65  N/A $23.62 
Previous Quarter N/A $22.95 $23.20 N/A $23.08 
Second Quarter 2008 N/A $24.47  $24.35  N/A $24.41  
Second Quarter 2007 N/A $23.38  $23.33  N/A $23.36  
 
 
 
Source:  CB Richard Ellis, Cushman & Wakefield, Grubb & Ellis, Norris, Beggs & Simpson Quarterly Reports and 
Statistical Reports, First Quarter 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Vacancy rates above include subleases except those reported by CBRE.  CBD figures include close-in neighborhoods, 
except Class A figures reported by CBRE.  All rents are full service.  All other suburban figures include Vancouver. 
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According to Grubb & Ellis, over 370,000 SF of newly constructed office space has been 
delivered to the market so far this year, falling just above the ten-year low point of 323,797 
square feet seen in 2005 versus the peak of over two million square feet in 1999.  Besides the 
766,919 square feet currently under construction in the second quarter, Grubb & Ellis reports 
a little over 2.4 million square feet of planned or proposed office space. 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Second Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
 
 
CBD Trends 
The median Class A vacancy in the CBD actually dropped 0.1 percentage points over last 
quarter from 6.4% to 6.3%, although asking rents dropped $1.58 since last quarter.  Stable 
companies are taking advantage of current conditions to take over more space in desirable 
areas.  Sublease availability has leveled off this quarter according to Cushman and Wakefield. 
Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
 
 
Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland First Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
Suburbs:  
Most vacancies have been felt in the suburbs, 
especially southwest. Kruse Way was hit hard, 
because of the nature of the businesses located 
there and the completion of Kruse Oaks III, 
adding a vacant 110,000 SF to the submarket.  
The Tualatin/Wilsonville submarket still shows 
the greatest vacancy rate of 26.9%, although its 
current vacant square footage of 430,302 SF 
equals only one-quarter the vacant square 
footage found in The Washington Square/ 
Kruse Way submarket, which now has highest 
total vacant square footage with 1,653,480 SF 
currently vacant.  According to CBRE, Airport 
Way also saw an increase in vacancy with the 
addition of 92,754 SF at Cascade Station II. 
There is very little new construction in the 
pipeline with TMT Development halting con-
struction on the Park Avenue West tower. New 
designs show reduction from 32 to 26 stories 
(24 office, 4 more than before, and 2 retail) and 
no condominiums.  CBRE reports over six 
suburban submarkets with over 20% vacancy:  
Airport Way, Beaverton, Hillsboro, Kruse Way, 
Tualatin and Washington Square. 
*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First 
Quarter 2009 Statistics 
Suburban Office Submarkets Ranked by 
Highest Percent of Vacancy 
Submarket Rank 
Vacancy 
Rate 
Camas       3  25.3% 
Cascade Park       6  18.8% 
Vancouver       9  14.7% 
Clackamas Sunnyside     14  8.60% 
Clark Co. Outlying     11  14.1% 
Columbia Corridor       4  23.0% 
Eastside     16  7.4% 
Hazel Dell/Salmon Creek     17  5.5% 
Johns Landing/Barbur 
Blvd     10  14.5% 
Northwest     15  7.9% 
Orchards       7  16.8% 
St. Johns/Central 
Vancouver     12  10.7% 
Sunset Corridor       2  25.6% 
SW/Beaverton/Sylvan       7  16.8% 
Tualatin/Wilsonville       1  26.9% 
Vancouver Mall     13  9.00% 
Washington Sq/Kruse 
Way       5  19.6% 
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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Major Lease Transactions Q2 2009   
Lessee Property Submarket 
Size 
(SF) 
Ashmead Education (renewal) Plaza West Building Tigard 20,646 
ADP, Inc (renewal) ADP Plaza CBD 115,180 
Corvel ODS Tower Southeast 21,664 
Genesis Financial Solutions 
(renewal) Creekside Corporate Park Beaverton 27,862 
Health Net Health Plan of OR 
(renewal) Triangle Corp Park III Tigard 54,579 
Kaiser Permanente Murray Scholls Town Center Beaverton 17,795 
Northwest Area Indian Health 
Board Broadway Plaza CBD 16,792 
Papa Murphy's International Clark Center Building Vancouver 24,267 
SAIF 1500 SW First Ave CBD 32,726 
West Coast Bank 5000 Meadows Kruse Way 16,044 
Source:  CB Richard Ellis, MarketView Second Quarter 2009 Office Report, Norris, Beggs and Simpson,  
"Market Summaries 2Q09", Cushman and Wakefield, "MarketBeat 2Q09", Grubb & Ellis, "Office Trends Report 
2Q09" 
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Portland Industrial Market Analysis 
 
 
CB Richard Ellis notes that a recent report by the Pew Charitable Trusts remarks that Oregon 
leads the nation in green energy related jobs and that several companies have chosen Portland 
for their American headquarters, including Vestas, REPower, and Iberdrola Renewables.  
According to Moody’s Economy.com, Oregon is one of five states expected to lead the recovery 
with its high tech industry.1 
That being said, the median vacancy as reported by the four largest commercial brokerage 
firms increased to 8.3%, up 0.5 of a percentage point from last quarter and over three 
percentage points from the second quarter of 2007.  CB Richard Ellis expects it to reach double 
digits before the market begins to recover.   
The industrial market experienced negative absorption again this quarter as a result of the 
return of a little over 1.5 million square feet of vacated industrial space to the market, nearly 
one third of which was due to the liquidation of Joe’s and the closure of GM Service Parks 
Center in Beaverton, as reported by CBRE.  Norris, Beggs & Simpson report that several 
tenants have left the Columbia Business Center.   
Leverage 2 Productions absorbed a little over 60,000 square feet in Clackamas. Monthly shell 
asking rates have held steady at a median of $0.41/SF, while flex rates dropped slightly to 
$0.80.   There are currently 442,500 square feet under construction; 415,000 square feet are 
being built for FedEx, which is expected to create 650 new jobs.  Due to credit restrictions and 
other impediments, landlords are offering few tenant improvements. 
INDUSTRIAL    Q2-09 
CB 
Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman 
& 
Wakefield 
Grubb 
& Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-wide Vacancy 8.1% 8.0% 8.5% 13.9% 8.3% 
Previous Quarter 7.3% 7.6% 8.0% 13.0% 7.8% 
Second Quarter 2008 5.8% 6.3% 6.7% N/A 6.3% 
Second Quarter 2007 5.2% 4.9% 5.6% N/A 5.2% 
Warehouse/Distribution N/A 7.7% 8.6% N/A 8.2% 
Previous Quarter 8.0% 7.3% 8.1% N/A 8.0% 
Second Quarter 2008 N/A 5.8% 6.8% N/A 6.3% 
Second Quarter 2007 N/A 3.8% 5.1% N/A 4.5% 
R&D/Flex Vacancy N/A 9.6% 7.9% 15.1% 9.6% 
Previous Quarter 10.1% 9.5% 7.2% 13.6% 9.8% 
Second Quarter 2008 N/A 9.2% 6.5% N/A 7.9% 
Second Quarter 2007 N/A 9.5% 7.3% N/A 8.4% 
Asking Monthly Shell Rates $0.40 N/A $0.41 N/A $0.41 
Previous Quarter $0.40  N/A $0.42  N/A $0.41 
Second Quarter 2008 $0.39  N/A $0.42  N/A $0.41 
Second Quarter 2007 $0.36  N/A $0.39  N/A $0.38 
Asking Monthly Flex Rates $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.80 N/A $0.80 
Previous Quarter $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.81 N/A $0.81 
Second Quarter 2008 $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.82 N/A $0.82 
Second Quarter 2007 $0.75-$0.85 N/A $0.81 N/A $0.81 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Cushman and Wakefield, Norris, Beggs & Simpson, Quarterly Reports  
 
                                                
1 Oregon could lead nation out of recession, Moody's says 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield Industrial Quarterly Summary, 2Q09 
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, Second Quarter 2009 
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, First Quarter 2009 
 
 
Major Lease Transactions Q2 09   
Industrial       
Tenant Address  (Sq. Ft.) Submarket 
Daimler AG 6650,6720 N. Basin 82,500 North/Northeast 
GE Security (renewal) Leveton Corp. Campus 138,000 Tualatin 
Leverage 2 Productions Clackamas Commons 60,807 Clackamas 
LG Electronics Rivergate Corp. Center I 80,000 North/Northeast 
Mackay-Mitchell 
Envelope Co. 
2515 Mailwell Dr. 64,500 Southeast 
PFX Pet (renewal) PDX East 51,078 North/Northeast 
Turner Engineering Port of Vancouver 58,451 Vancouver 
 Total 314,836  
 *Source:  NAI Norris Beggs & Simpson, CB Richard Ellis, and Cushman & Wakefield, Industrial 
Quarterly Reports, Third Quarter 2008, and the Portland Business Journal  
 
Chastain • Downtown Retail Parking Market Analysis  
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •   Quarterly & Urban Development Journal •3rd Quarter 2009 • Page 78 
Downtown Retail Core Parking Market Analysis 
 
 
Parking occupancy rates in a downtown area change dynamically and are a reasonable 
measure for economic activity transacted there. Office vacancies change more slowly, as does 
retail store vacancy while retail sales and hotel occupancies are more closely aligned with 
parking occupancies.  
 
There are over 9,600 parking spaces in the retail core, defined by PDC to mean the area located 
between SW Washington to SW Salmon and SW 2nd to SW 12th Streets, but only one quarter of 
those spaces (2,467 spaces) are in SmartPark structures, owned by the City, and most 
attractive to shoppers because of their uniform consistent pricing and lower rates.  
 
There are three public parking garages run by SmartPark, within the downtown retail core.  
Parking occupancy in these three garages can be used as a proxy for retail activity in the area, 
as these serve Pioneer Place and other shops in the area.  
 
A Central City Parking Analysis conducted by Kittelson and Associates in November of 2008 for 
the Portland Office of Transportation, found that parking garages typically experience peak 
occupancy during the midday, from 1:00 - 2:00 p.m., and that most were operating near 
capacity.  Kittelson reports that “[t]he data collection for this study was conducted in May and 
June 2008 and was scheduled to avoid the Portland Rose Festival and other major events.”   
 
On-street parking experiences peak occupancy during the midday but its largest peak is in the 
evening, probably due to the fact that on street parking is free after 7:00 p.m.  
 
Chastain • Downtown Retail Parking Market Analysis  
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •   Quarterly & Urban Development Journal •3rd Quarter 2009 • Page 79 
 
 
 
The following graphs show the monthly average weekday peak occupancy levels in the three 
SmartPark downtown retail core garages since January of 2004. 
 
S.W. 3rd and Alder 
The garage at S.W. 3rd and Alder has 839 available spaces at a rate of $1.50/weekday hour, $4 
weekday evening maximum, and $5 weekend evening maximum (effective July 13, 2009). The 
peak in December, 2007 reached 95.2% average weekday occupancy, compared to December, 
2008 which saw an average peak occupancy of only 72.4%.  The five-year average of peak 
occupancies from January 2004 to June 2009 is 81.4%.  The average from January 2004 to 
December 2007 was 81.9%, while the average from January 2008 to June 2009 remained close 
to the overall average at 80.2%. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  SmartPark monthly occupancy reports 
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S.W. 4th and Yamhill 
 
The garage at S.W. 4th and Yamhill shows higher average peak weekday occupancy.  It has 650 
available spaces.  It achieved a 97.1% peak occupancy level in December of 2006.  The overall 
five-year average from January of 2004 to June, 2009 was 86.8%.  The average from January 
2004 to December of 2007 was 89.7%.  The average from January 2008 to June 2009 has 
dropped to 78.7%.  The parking fee is $1.50/hour, $4/weekday hour (after the first four 
hours), $4 weekday hourly maximum, and a weekend hourly maximum of $5/hour). 
 
 
 
Source:  SmartPark monthly occupancy reports 
**Data unavailable January 2008. 
 
 
 
Source:  SmartPark, Entry/Exit Report, Thursday, June 25, 2009. 
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S.W. 10th and Yamhill 
 
The SmartPark parking structure at S.W. 10th and Yamhill has 794 available spaces.  The 
average peak occupancy from January 2004 to December 2007 was 83.1%.  The five-year 
average from January 2004 to June 2009 was 81.0%.  The average from January 2008 to June 
2009 was 75.7%, showing a drop in activity since the beginning of 2008.  Parking fees are 
$1.50 per weekday hour and a $4 weekday evening maximum.   
 
 
 
**Data unavailable September through December 2005. 
Source:  SmartPark monthly occupancy report 
 
 
 
  
 
